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Abstract
This paper develops a logical theory that unifies all three standard types of argumentative
attack in AI, namely rebutting, undercutting and undermining attacks. We build on default
justification logic that already represents undercutting and rebutting attacks, and we add
undermining attacks. Intuitively, undermining does not target default inference, as under-
cutting, or default conclusion, as rebutting, but rather attacks an argument’s premise as
a starting point for default reasoning. In default justification logic, reasoning starts from
a set of premises, which is then extended by conclusions that hold by default. We argue
that modeling undermining defeaters in the view of default theories requires changing the
set of premises upon receiving new information. To model changes to premises, we give
a dynamic aspect to default justification logic by using the techniques from the logic of
belief revision. More specifically, undermining is modeled with belief revision operations
that include contracting a set of premises, that is, removing some information from it. The
novel combination of default reasoning and belief revision in justification logic enriches
both approaches to reasoning under uncertainty. By the end of the paper, we show some
important aspects of defeasible argumentation in which our logic compares favorably to
structured argumentation frameworks.
Keywords Justification logic · Defeasible argumentation · Reasoning dynamics ·
Undermining attacks
Mathematics Subject Classification (2010) 03B60 · 68T27 · 68T30 · 68T37
1 Introduction
In this paper, we investigate the dynamics of default theories with justification logic for-
mulas that represent defeasible arguments. The existing work about dynamics in formal
argumentation [2, 3, 17, 23–26, 49, 64] almost entirely focuses on abstract argumentation
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frameworks in the style of Dung [27]. The literature on the dynamics of structured argu-
mentation is limited to the DeLP framework [4, 5], where the dynamics is understood as
adding or removing strict and defeasible rules, and ASPIC+ [47], where the dynamic com-
ponent is meant to resolve symmetric attacks by updating preferences. The current paper,
based on [52], advances this line of research by specifying a variety of dynamic operators
for modeling changes of argument systems based on default justification logic.
The basic format of our default theories has been developed in [50, 51, 54], where we
interpret justification formulas of the form t : F as arguments that can defeat other formu-
las by means of undercut or rebuttal. Informally, for some defeasible argument understood
as a premise-claim pair, a rebutting defeater is a reason for the opposite claim. An under-
cutting defeater is a reason that attacks the connection between the premises and the claim
supported by the premises. In Pollock’s [55] favourite example, an agent starts from the
fact that a table looks red, which gives the agent a default reason to claim that the color of
the table is red. If the agent finds out that the table is illuminated with red light, the agent
has an undercutting reason against the initial reasoning to the conclusion that the table is
in fact red. Moreover, were the agent also to find out that the table has been painted white
recently, the agent would have a rebutting reason against to the claim that it is red-colored.
These types of conflicts are illustrated in Fig. 1, together with undermining which will be
introduced shortly.
Technically, the workings of undercut and rebuttal rely on defining default theories
with default rules based on justification logic formulas. In such rules, justification terms
codify defeasible inferences in their structure. Besides undercutting and rebutting defeat,
AI researchers have investigated an additional standard type of argument defeat called
“undermining”. According to [29, p. 626], an argument is undermined if its premises or
assumptions are attacked. In an extension of Pollock’s example, an undermining attack
would target the starting premise that the table looked red in the first place.
Notice that undermining does not target default inference, as undercutting, or default
conclusion, as rebutting, but rather attacks an argument’s premise as a starting point for
default reasoning. This motivated the distinction between default and plausible reasoning in
formal argumentation that we adopt in this paper. In the plausible reasoning paradigm, falli-
bility of reasoning results from adding new information that questions old information and,
thereby, it might question old conclusions.1 In contrast, in the default reasoning paradigm,
fallibility results from adding some further true information on top of existing information
and this new information in turn gives reasons to question old conclusions, but they do not
question old information.2
We will show that introducing dynamic operators for justification logic default theo-
ries enables us to model undermining. Defeating an argument by attacking its premise or
its assumption is not new to structured argumentation. In assumption-based argumentation
(ABA) [28], all attacks are reduced to this type and in ASPIC+ [56], ordinary premises of an
1Rescher’s [62, 63] work is the landmark reference for the study of plausible reasoning. Rescher [63, p. 39]
claims that “a thesis is more or less plausible depending on the reliability of the sources that vouch for it”.
2Note here that Prakken [57, p. 2198] refers to the difference between defeasible and plausible reasoning,
instead of default and plausible reasoning. To be clear about the terminology, we use the etymologically
close terms “defeasible” and “defeat” in a more general sense, so that, e.g., undermining is normally also
considered as a type of defeat. This conforms to the standard usage of “defeat” and “defeasibility” which
simply mean that something is annulled. The term “default”, on the other hand, has a more specific meaning
related to default assumptions introduced by Reiter [60, p. 82]. Vreeswijk [71] introduced the distinction
between the two kinds of non-monotonicity to argumentation theory (using the term “defeasible”). See [57,
pp. 2241-2243] for more details on this distinction.
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Fig. 1 Three types of defeat
between arguments
argument are susceptible to undermining. However, these systems do not provide an insight
into the logical workings of undermining, because they specify neither a concrete logical
language nor inference rules.
In our default theories, undermining can be given a precise logical interpretation. While
undercut and rebuttal rely on the uncertainty of default arguments, undermining changes the
context from which agents make further inferences. For a specific default theory, this context
is determined by the set of starting premises, W. Our idea is that, since undermining targets
the given premises, it should be modeled as a result of non-inferential information inputs
that require contracting the set of premises (or facts) of a default theory. This means that we
will define undermining by “climbing up” the definitions of more fundamental operations
of default theory changes. To elicit the reasoning process behind undermining, we specify
four different logical operations that model undermining: prioritized and non-prioritized
contraction and prioritized and non-prioritized revision.
The paper is organized as follows. The logic introduced in [50, 51, 54] already mod-
els non-monotonicity with the use of undercut and rebuttal. We use this logic to exemplify
Toulmin’s [67] argumentation model in our default theories. The example is later extended
to illustrate conceptual differences in the workings of undercutting, rebutting and undermin-
ing. After specifying the elements of arguments in default justification logic, we describe
how we plan to connect dynamic operations for such default theories with undermin-
ing defeaters. Section 3 is the main technical contribution of this paper, where we define
dynamic operations for default theories with justification formulas. The operations we intro-
duce combine Hansson’s [39] base revision operations with a specific kind of standard
Reiter default rules. Our approach to defining the dynamic operators for default theory revi-
sion has most in common with Antoniou’s [7] approach, which deals with the dynamics
of Reiter’s default theories. We show by the end of Section 3 that undermining attacks on
premises correspond to those dynamic operations that involve either contraction or a variant
of non-prioritized contraction. In Section 4, our goal is to show that there are some impor-
tant advantages of using default justification logic for argumentation over using structured
frameworks for argumentation. The same section also establishes rational behaviour of our
system with respect to the “non-interference” postulate [19]. Finally, Section 5 gives an
extensive overview of the related work.
2 Logic of default reasons
The logic of default justifications was first defined in [50] and our definitions in this section
follow those given in [54]. We start by outlining the underlying justification logic on which
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we base default theories. Before we formally introduce syntax, several preliminary remarks
on how to build justification assertions of the type t : F are in order.
One of the basic operations of standard justification logics is Application (‘·’) exempli-
fied by the following formula
u : (F → G) → (t : F → (u · t) : G).
By focusing only on the propositional content of the formula, one may notice the familiar
structure of a modus ponens inference from F → G and F to G. The added machinery of
reason terms syntactically captures the dependence of the consequent G on the propositions
F → G and F . This dependence is witnessed by the structure of the reason term (u · t)
which shows that the reason u has been applied to the reason t .
In addition to application, all standard justification logics include the operation known as
Sum ‘+’. Sum admits of merging two reason terms into a single term as done, for example,
in the formula
t : F → (t + u) : F .
The intuition behind Sum is that, if evidence t justifies some formula F , then adding new
evidence u to t will not invalidate t being a reason for F . Thus, standard justifications are
inherently non-defeasible.
The underlying logic for our default theories is a standard justification logic with non-
defeasible and truth-inducing reasons. We assume both Application and Sum operations for
this logic. Moreover, to ensure that all reasons in this logic are truth-inducing, the logic
contains the axiom t : F → F called Factivity. This axiom corresponds to the modal logic
truth axiom: F → F read as “If F is known, then F ”. Our choice of basing default
theories on a logic of non-defeasible and truth-inducing reasons is in line with the strategy of
standard default logics [6], where defeasible conclusions are based on certain information.
2.1 Logic of factive reasons JTCS
The first variant of justification logic was the logic of proofs (LP) introduced in [8] and
fully developed in [9]. Two recent monographs on justification logic systems [11, 41] report
on this growing research area. The logic of non-defeasible and factive reasons that we use
here was first defined by Brezhnev [18]. For more basic information on its relation to other
justification logics see [32].
2.1.1 Syntax, axioms and rules
The basic format of justification assertions is “t : F ”, where a justification term “t”
is informally interpreted as a reason or justification for “F ”. The set T m consists of
exactly all justification terms, constructed from variables x1, . . . , xn, . . . and proof con-
stants c1, . . . , cn, . . . by means of operations · and +, i.e., by means of the above discussed
Application and Sum. The following Backus-Naur form gives the grammar of justification
terms:
t ::= x | c | (t · t) | (t + t)
where x is a variable denoting an unspecified justification and c is a proof constant, taken as
atomic within the system. A set of subterms Sub(t) is defined by induction on the construc-
tion of a term t . The set Fm consists of exactly all JTCS formulas based on the countable
set of propositional atoms P and defined by the following Backus-Naur form:
F ::=  | P | (F → F) | (F ∨ F) | (F ∧ F) | ¬F | t : F
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where P ∈ P and t ∈ T m.
We can now define the logic JTCS, which is the weakest logic with non-defeasible rea-
sons containing axiom schemes for the two basic operations · and +. These are the axioms
of JTCS:
A0 All the instances of propositional logic tautologies from Fm
A1 t : (F → G) → (u : F → (t · u) : G) (Application)
A2 t : F → (t + u) : F ; u : F → (t + u) : F (Sum)
A3 t : F → F (Factivity)
Before defining the rules of inference, we first discuss the role that proof constants
c1, . . . , cn, . . . have within the system. Proof constants are justifications of basic logic
axioms, which are considered to be “justified ex officio” [10, § 2.3], that is, by their sta-
tus in the system. The set of all formulas justified by proof constants is called a Constant
Specification (CS) set:
Definition 1 (Constant specification) CS = {cn : cn−1 : · · · : c1 : F |
F is an instance of A0-A3, cn, cn−1, . . . , c1 are proof constants and n ∈ N}
Notice that CS contains the basic logical axioms justified by proof constants and all
the justification assertions likewise produced. In justification logics, constant specification
sets are used to parametrize the counterpart of the modal logic necessitation rule: “If F is
provable, then infer F ”.
Together with the standard modus ponens rule, JTCS logic includes the justification logic
variant of the necessitation rule:
R0 From F and F → G infer G (Modus ponens)
R1 If F is an axiom instance of A0-A3 and cn, cn−1, . . . , c1 proof constants such that
cn : cn−1 : · · · : c1 : F ∈ CS , then infer cn : cn−1 : · · · : c1 : F (Iterated axiom
necessitation)
The necessitation rules of justification logics regulate only logical awareness of axioms.
Theorem necessitation turns into a constructive property of justification logic derivations
called Internalization [11, p. 21]. To ensure that the Internalization holds for JTCS and
following the idea that each logical axiom is justified by exactly one constant, we require
that CS in R1 respects the following two conditions:
• Axiomatically appropriate: for each axiom instance A, there is a constant c such that
c : A ∈ CS and for each formula cn : cn−1 : · · · : c1 : A ∈ CS such that n ≥ 1, there is
a constant cn+1 such that cn+1 : cn : cn−1 : · · · : c1 : A ∈ CS;
• Injective: each proof constant c justifies at most one formula.
We could think of a set of formulas generated by assigning a Gödel number to each axiom
instance and to each instance of R1 as a concrete example of one such constant specification
set.
We say that the formula F is JTCS-provable (JTCS  F ) if F can be derived using the
axioms A0-A3 and rules R0 and R1. A concrete example of the workings behind the JTCS
axioms is the derivation of t : P → ((c · t) + u) : (Q → P).
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Proof (JTCS  t : P → ((c · t) + u) : (Q → P))
1 P → (Q → P) (A0)
2 c : [P → (Q → P)] (1, R1)
3 c : [P → (Q → P)] → [t : P → (c · t) : (Q → P)] (A1)
4 t : P → (c · t) : (Q → P) (2, 3R0)
5 (c · t) : (Q → P) → ((c · t) + u) : (Q → P) (A2)
6 t : P → (c · t) : (Q → P) → ([(c · t) : (Q → P)→((c · t) + u) : (Q → P)] →
[t : P → ((c · t) + u) : (Q → P)]) (A0)
7 (c · t) : (Q → P) → ((c · t) + u) : (Q → P) →
[t : P → ((c · t) + u) : (Q → P)] (4, 6R0)
8 t : P → ((c · t) + u) : (Q → P) (5, 7R0)
2.1.2 Semantics
The now-standard semantics of standard justification logics, known as “Fitting’s seman-
tics” [30, 31], is essentially an elaborated possible worlds semantics for epistemic logic. As
familiar from the standard epistemic logic, Fitting’s semantics requires F to be true in all
accessible alternatives for the truth of the justification assertion t : F . In addition to this,
the truth of t : F is conditioned on the admissibility of t as a reason for the formula F in the
current state. The semantics for JTCS we define here is based on a single-world justifica-
tion model, which adapts Mkrtychev’s single-world model semantics for the logic of proofs
(LP) [46]. The JTCS logic is sound and complete with respect to Mkrtychev’s reflexive
interpretations [46].
In the logic of default reasons from Section 2.2, the main idea of the semantics is to give
a procedure that determines the admissibility of reasons. This justifies our choice to fully
focus on the admissibility condition by taking the single-world models perspective, as done
in [54].
Definition 2 (JTCS model) We define a function reason assignment based on CS ,
∗(·) : T m → 2Fm,
a function mapping each term to a set of formulas from Fm. We assume that it satisfies the
following conditions:
1. If F → G ∈ ∗(t) and F ∈ ∗(u), then G ∈ ∗(t · u),
2. ∗(t) ∪ ∗(u) ⊆ ∗(t + u) and
3. If c : F ∈ CS , then F ∈ ∗(c).
A truth assignment v : P → {T rue, False} is a function assigning truth values to
propositional atoms in P . We define the interpretation I as a pair (v, ∗). For an interpreta-
tion I , we define |= as a truth relation on the set of formulas of JTCS. We say that, for any
formula t : F ∈ Fm, it holds that
I |= t : F iff F ∈ ∗(t).
Truth conditions for atomic propositions, ¬, →, ∧ and ∨ are defined as usual.
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An interpretation I is reflexive iff the truth relation for I fulfills the following condition:
• For any term t and any formula F , if F ∈ ∗(t), then I |= F .
The consequence relation of the logic of factive reasons JTCS is defined on reflexive
interpretations:
Definition 3 (JTCS consequence relation)  |= F iff for all reflexive interpretations I , if
I |= B for all B ∈ , then I |= F .
For a set of formulas Γ ⊆ Fm and the JTCS consequence relation |= defined above, a
JTCS closure of Γ is given by T hJTCS (Γ ) = {F |Γ |= F }. For a closure T hJTCS (Γ ), it
holds that CS ⊆ T hJTCS (Γ ). We will also make use of a weaker “non-monotonic” JT−
closure for which a reason assignment function ∗(·) does not meet the sum condition (2) and
a constant specification set is additionally restricted to CS− ⊂ CS , such that CS− excludes
each formula cn : cn−1 : · · · : c1 : F with F being an instance of A2. The purpose of
weakly closing a set of JTCS formulas is to investigate which formulas follow according to
all the standard axioms and rules, but without assuming the monotonicity of justifications
imposed by the sum axioms A2.
2.2 Logic of default reasons
Building on the JTCS syntax, we introduce the definition of the default theory:
Definition 4 (Default Theory) A default theory T is a pair (W,D), where W is a finite
set of JTCS formulas and D is a countable set of default rules. Each default rule is of the
following form:
δ = t : F :: (u · t) : G
(u · t) : G .
The informal reading of the default δ is: “If t is a reason justifying F , and it is consistent
to assume that (u · t) is a reason justifying G, then (u · t) is a defeasible reason justifying G”.
In the rule δ, the formula t : F is called the prerequisite, (u · t) : G above the line is called
the consistency requirement and (u · t) : G below the line is called the consequent of δ. We
refer to each of these formulas by pre(δ), req(δ) and cons(δ), respectively. The default rule
δ introduces a unique reason term u, which means that, for a default theory T , the following
three conditions are required:
1. For any formula v : H such that v : H ∈ T hJTCS (W), it holds that u = v;
2. For any formula H ∈ W , u : (F → G) is not a subformula of H and
3. For any default rule δ′ ∈ D such that δ′ = t ′:F ′::(u′·t ′):G′
(u′·t ′):G′ , if u = u′, then F = F ′ and
G = G′.
The first uniqueness condition reflects the idea that the reason term u holds only other
things being equal. As such, it cannot justify formulas entailed by the set of starting
premises that are considered facts. In other words, u is not considered to be a factive reason.
The second uniqueness condition has a twofold role. Technically, it blocks redundancy that
would result from including u : (F → G) in W . Were it the case that both u : (F → G) and
t : F are in W , (u · t) : G would be contained in the closure of W by application. Concep-
tually, the second condition blocks that there is any certainty regarding whether the formula
u : (F → G) holds or not. This is only determined in the semantics for default theories
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that will be given shortly. The last uniqueness condition reserves the reasoning codified by
u as a justification of the conditional F → G, where F and G are some specific JTCS for-
mulas. Although this condition does not preclude the possibility of two defaults sharing the
underlying conditional u : (F → G), it imposes some limitations on the expresiveness of
our defaults to which we return in Section 5. As it will become clearer by the end of this
section, the reason term u in δ is ultimately a JTCS codification of some derivations steps
taken to “prove” the formula F → G. But the derivation is such that it is conditional on at
least one assumption that we cannot get rid of by the end of derivation.
Every default rule produces a reason term whose structure codifies an application opera-
tion step. In contrast to axiom A1, we do not require the formula u : (F → G) in δ above to
be a part of the knowledge base. Instead, u : (F → G) is the underlying assumption of δ on
the basis of which we are able to extend an incomplete knowledge base. The propositions of
this kind are important in the system since they function as rules allowing for default steps,
but they are also specific JTCS formulas. They will be referred to as “warrants”, because
their twofold role mirrors that of Toulmin’s argument warrants [67, p. 91]. To illustrate
how we represent arguments in justification logic, we will use Toulmin’s famous example
[67, p. 92] of arguing for the claim that Harry is a British subject.
Example 5 The claim that Harry is a British subject “can be defended by appeal to the
information that he was born in Bermuda, for this datum lends support to our conclusion on
account of the warrants implicit in the British Nationality Acts...” [67, p. 94]. The example
is translated into a justification logic default as follows. Given the fact that Harry was born
in Bermuda (B), an agent can conclude that Harry is a British subject (S):
r : B :: (s · r) : S
(s · r) : S .
The default can be read as follows: “If r is a reason justifying that Harry was born in
Bermuda and it is consistent to assume that (s ·r) is a reason justifying that Harry is a British
subject, then (s · r) is a defeasible reason justifying that Harry is a British subject”.
An argument in default justification logic can be delimited in three different ways,
depending on how many layers of the argument are taken into consideration. Figure 2
depicts the above formalized argument as a three-layered structure inspired by Toulmin’s
layout of arguments, including the concepts of data, claim, warrant and backing. Notice
that Fig. 2 associates a concrete logical object to each component of Toulmin’s argument
Fig. 2 Three-layered structure of arguments in the JTCS language. Toulmin’s layout of arguments
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schema. For example, the prerequisite formula r : B represents data for the argument under-
stood as a default rule. By the end of the section, we emphasize the role of warrants, such as
s : (B → S), in defining argumentation semantics. Before we give the definition of argu-
mentation semantics, we first focus on defining the basis of collecting new information by
applying the available defaults.
The procedure for applying defaults in our default theories is inspired by Antoniou’s [6]
operational semantics for Reiter’s default theories [60]. The approach taken by Antoniou
is to provide a constructive characterization of default theory extensions by determining
those sequences of defaults that generate extensions. For our default theory T = (D, W)
a sequence of default rules Π = (δ0, δ1, . . .) is a possible order in which a list of default
rules without multiple occurrences from D is applied (Π is possibly empty). Applicability
of defaults is determined by the following definition:
Definition 6 (Applicability) For a set of JTCS-closed formulas Γ we say that a default rule
δ = t :F ::(u·t):G
(u·t):G is applicable to Γ iff t : F ∈ Γ and ¬(u · t) : G /∈ Γ .
Default consequents are brought together in the set of JTCS formulas that represents the
current evidence base:
Definition 7 (Evidence base) In(Π) = T hJTCS (W ∪ {cons(δ) | δ ∈ Π}).
By an abuse of set-builder notation, we use ‘∈’ as a shorthand for “occurs in” when
defaults are singled out as members of sequences of defaults. The set In(Π) pools
reason-based formulas. Their acceptability depends on the acceptability of other available
(counter-)-reasons and this is dealt with later in argumentation semantics. All our default
theories are normal, which means that any default has a single consistency requirement
formula which corresponds to its consequent formula. Our operational semantics is thus
simplified, because we do not need to define Out-sets [6, p. 32] that keep track of assump-
tions made in applying non-normal defaults, as done in the operational semantics for
standard default logics.
In the operational part of the semantics, we need to determine those sequences of defaults
that are significant for a theory T , namely, default processes. For a sequence Π , the initial
segment of the sequence is denoted as Π [k], where k indicates the number of elements
contained in that segment of the sequence and where Π has at least k elements. Any segment
Π [k] is also a sequence. We can now define default processes:
Definition 8 (Process) A sequence of default rules Π is a process of a default theory T =
(W,D) iff every k such that δk ∈ Π is applicable to the set In(Π [k]), where Π [k] =
(δ0, . . . δk−1).
The kind of process that we are focusing on is called closed process: a process Π is said
to be closed iff every δ ∈ D that is applicable to In(Π) is already in Π . Closed processes
are necessary to define extension sets for default theories.
Building on the operational part of the semantics, we can now define the argumentation
part of the semantics, with the main role that warrants perform in this part. Warrants extend
the interpretation of the application operation “·”, and their use determines how we define
defeaters in justification logic. Each warrant is made explicit by means of a function warrant
assignment:
#(·) : D → Fm.
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The function maps each default rule to a specific justified conditional as follows:
#(δ) = u : (F → G),
where δ ∈ D and δ = t :F ::(u·t):G
(u·t):G , for some reason term t , a unique reason term u and
some formulas F and G. As mentioned above, uniqueness of u does not prevent two default
rules to share a warrant formula. This reflects also the informal idea of warrants as general
rules that are, in principle, applicable to different starting data, that is, different prerequi-
sites of defaults.3 A set of all such underlying warrants of default rules is called Warrant
Specification (WS) set.
Definition 9 (Warrant specification) For a default theory T = (W,D), justified defeasible
conditionals are given by the Warrant Specification set:
WST = #(D) = {#(δ) | δ ∈ D}.
When relativized to a specific process Π , we will talk about the set WSΠ .
The possibility to refer to warrants within the language enables us to model undercut-
ting defeaters [21, 55]. Intuitively, an undercutter u for t : F gives us a reason not to accept
a claim F on account of establishing that there is some exclusionary circumstance in light
of which which t does not support F . In our logic, undercutting reasons defeat other rea-
sons by denying that their warrant provides support for the conclusion in an undercutting
circumstance.
Definition 10 (Undercut) A reason u undercuts reason t being a reason for a formula F in
a set of JTCS formulas Γ ⊆ In(Π [k]) iff
∨
v∈Sub(t)
u : ¬[v : (G → H)] ∈ T hJTCS (Γ )
and v : (G → H) ∈ WSΠ ′ for a process Π ′ of T .
We say that a set Γ ⊆ In(Π [k]) undercuts reason t being a reason for a formula F iff,
for a subterm v of t , ¬[v : (G → H)] ∈ T hJTCS (Γ ) and v : (G → H) ∈ WSΠ ′ for a
process Π ′ of T . According to the definition, undercut is first and foremost an asymmetric
attack relation, but it is possible that two reasons undercut each other. The undercut rela-
tion can be intuitively explained through the three layers of justification logic arguments
from Fig. 2. Undercut occurs at the second layer where we consider warrants. In the con-
text of defaults, warrants function as formulas representing rules of inference whereby we
introduce defeasible arguments. By introducing some argument u : ¬[s : (B → S)], the
default rule, that is, the warrant s : (B → S), has been attacked and the defeasible argument
(s · r) : S is undercut. At the layer of backings, undercut can be seen as occurring between
two terms. For example, the JTCS derivation u′ ∈ Sub(u) “proves” that an assumption made
in the JTCS derivation s does not provide support for B → S under an added circumstance.
Notice that for these two layers, undercut might not be directly connected to the formula S.
For example, u would also undercut some reason (s′′ · (s′ · (s · r))) for S′ by undercutting
3Formally, we also do not require that t = t ′ holds in the antecedent of condition 3.) for the general definition
of defaults above. This reflects the independence of the warrant u : (F → G) from the data (or premise)
t : F to which we apply the warrant.
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(s · r) : S as its sub-argument.4 This justifies a reading of Definition 10 on which u under-
cuts t for any formula F . Informally, we could say that an undercutter u attacks t whenever
t is quoted as a step to get to the claim F from some starting data.
Besides undercut, default reasons may conflict each other because they cannot be both
added to a same consistent process. For example, if a knowledge base contains a reason
for a statement F , then any default introducing a reason for ¬F will be inapplicable. This
enables us to obtain a formal representation of rebuttal among reasons for free already from
the operational semantics. Rebuttal is ultimately based on JTCS inconsistency and inappli-
cability of defaults, which means that this type of conflict induces symmetric attacks. We
use both undercut and JTCS inconsistency to characterize some of the standard argumenta-
tion extension notions [27] as, e.g., in defining stable semantics. The following definition
specifies conflict-free sets of arguments as those sets of arguments that are undercut-free as
follows:
Definition 11 (Conflict-free sets) A set of JTCS formulas Γ is conflict-free iff T hJTCS (Γ )
does not undercut reason t for a formula F such that t : F ∈ T hJT −(Γ ).
Notice the use of the JT− closure in this definition. This type of closure, which we
called “non-monotonic” avoids closing under the Sum operation. The JT− closure is a tool
to “filter out” some instances of undercut that do not generate genuine conflicts between
arguments. Assume, for instance, that a reason term u undercuts some term t as a reason
for F . Then u also undercuts (v + t) as a reason for G, for some G justified by v. Such
undercutter might be considered irrelevant. More specifically, if we assume that v is a factive
justification for G, then the undercut of (v + t) by u would not seem to genuinely defeat
(v+t) as a reason for G. The weak closure operation JT− is used to define conflict-free sets
by setting aside such cases of undercut that are induced by merely concatenating reasons.
Using the above definitions, we now define the semantics of acceptability for justification
assertions of the type t : F . This is the way to interpret justification assertions as arguments
in our semantics. In reasoning from a default theory T = (W,D), an agent always considers
potential extension sets of JTCS formulas that meet the following conditions:
1. W ⊆ Γ and
2. Γ ⊆ W ∪ {cons(Π) | Π is some process of T },
where cons(Π) = {cons(δ) | δ ∈ Π}. Potential extension sets are not closed under the JTCS
closure. The idea is that, before we are able check whether there are any potential conflicts
in a set of arguments and ascertain that a set of arguments is defensible, we do not know
yet whether all the logical consequences of those arguments are desirable. In Definition 13,
we apply the same strategy for JTCS-admissible extensions, which neither maximize inclu-
sion of acceptable arguments nor do they maximize inclusion of JTCS-derivable formulas.
Before we define admissible sets, we define the notion of acceptability of an argument t : F :
Definition 12 (Acceptability) For a process Π of a default theory T = (W,D), a formula
t : F ∈ cons(Π) is acceptable w.r.t. a set of JTCS formulas Γ ⊆ In(Π) iff for each
undercutting reason u for t being a reason for F such that u : G ∈ In(Π), T hJTCS (Γ )
undercuts u being a reason for G.
4Notice the use of the set of subterms Sub(t) above, which can also be used to determine sub-arguments in
our system. See [54, p. 35] for more details.
S. Pandžić
As it is known from formal argumentation, there are multiple strategies to decide on the
acceptability of arguments. Each of these strategies can be considered as a specific seman-
tics that generates sets of acceptable arguments called “extensions”. For example, a more
credulous strategy tends to maximize the set of acceptable arguments and it is represented,
e.g., by preferred extensions, while grounded extension represents skeptical strategies. The
JTCS variants of abstract argumentation semantics are used to determine whether a JTCS
formula is valid under a given semantics.
Definition 13 (JTCS Extensions) We define multiple argumentation theory extensions for
any default theory T = (W,D) based on the JTCS language:
JTCS-Admissible Extension A potential extension set of JTCS formulas Γ ⊂ In(Π) is a
JTCS-admissible extension of a default theory T = (W,D) iff T hJTCS (Γ ) is conflict-
free, each formula t : F ∈ Γ is acceptable with respect to Γ and Π is a closed process.
JTCS-Preferred Extension A closure T hJTCS (Γ ) of a JTCS-admissible extension Γ is a
JTCS-preferred extension of T iff for any other JTCS-admissible extension Γ ′, Γ ⊂ Γ ′.
JTCS-Complete Extension A closure T hJTCS (Γ ) of a JTCS-admissible extension Γ is a
JTCS-complete extension of T iff for each closed process Π of T such that there is a
JTCS-admissible extension Γ ′ in In(Π) and Γ ⊂ Γ ′, if a formula t : F ∈ cons(D) is
acceptable with respect to Γ in In(Π), then t : F belongs to Γ .
JTCS-Grounded Extension A JTCS-complete extension T hJTCS (Γ ) is the unique JTCS-
grounded extension of T if Γ is the smallest potential extension with respect to set
inclusion such that T hJTCS (Γ ) is a JTCS-complete extension of T .
JTCS-Stable Extension A conflict-free closure T hJTCS (Γ ) of a potential extension Γ is
a JTCS-stable extension iff for each δ ∈ D such that t : F = cons(δ) and t : F ∈
T hJTCS (Γ ), it holds that (1) Γ undercuts t : F or (2) δ is inapplicable to In(Π) for any
process Π such that Γ ⊂ In(Π).
It turns out that a large subclass of Dung’s abstract argumentation frameworks, excluding
only some kinds of attack cycles, can be proven to be a special case of our logic via estab-
lishing the correspondences of extensions. Therefore, we can obtain Dung’s frameworks
from justification logic-based theories by focusing on a single aspect of attack direction
among justification logic arguments. Moreover, Dung’s frameworks, modulo some attack
cycles, always have multiple justification logic instantiations called ”realizations”. These
results are shown in [54]. Throughout the rest of the paper, we only rely on the procedure
to obtain an abstract argumentation framework from a default theory T called Forgetful
projection [54, p. 26].
Notice that, in Dung’s original approach, we cannot represent joint attacks that possibly
emerge from the interaction of arguments. Forgetful projection is thus limited to a subclass
of default theories such that an argument can only attack other arguments if this attack is
a JTCS consequence of a single consequent formula for an applied default rule. Here, we
only informally recall the procedure that suffices for the purposes of specifying an attack
graph in our examples. Firstly, we obtain the graph nodes from those defaults that generate
potential extension sets, that is, that are applicable to a process of T . Each default rule from
D that is applied to a process of T is mapped to a node (an argument) in the corresponding
abstract argument framework. Then we specify the structure of attacks among the obtained
nodes. For any two defaults such that both defaults are applicable, but never occur together
in any process of T , the corresponding nodes or arguments attack each other. Moreover, if
a consequent of a default entails an undercutter for some consequent of a default (possibly
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the same default), this entailment translates into an asymmetric attack from the argument
that corresponds to the default whose consequent entails the undercutter.
The workings of argumentation semantics can be illustrated with a default theory that
develops from Example 5 and the argument for the claim that Harry is a British subject.
Example 14 (Continuation of Example 5) Recall that the agent started reasoning from the
fact that Harry was born in Bermuda (B) to conclude that Harry is a British subject (S) via
the following default:
δ1 = r : B :: (s · r) : S
(s · r) : S .
As mentioned above, the consequent of the default can be read as follows: “(s · r) is a
defeasible reason justifying that Harry is a British subject”.
However, if the agent were in possession of the additional information saying that both
Harry’s parents are aliens (P ), the “general authority of the warrant” s : (B → S) for the
claim S would have to be set aside. This is modeled with the following rule that introduces
an undercutting reason:
δ2 = t : P :: (u · t) : ¬[s : (B → S)]
(u · t) : ¬[s : (B → S)] .
The consequent can be read as follows: “(u · t) is a defeasible reason denying that the
reason s justifies that if Harry was born in Bermuda, then Harry is a British subject”. This
is a classical argumentation theory example of a defeater that leads to the suspension of
the conclusion supported by the reason (s · r). For a default theory T = (W,D) with
W = {r : B, t : P } and D = {δ1, δ2}, the process Π1 = (δ1, δ2) corresponds to such course
of reasoning with revised JTCS extensions.
In total T has two closed processes, Π1 and Π2 = (δ2, δ1). The structure of attacks
induced by the undercutting defeat is shown in Fig. 3, where the simple attack graph
structure represents arguments cons(δ1) and cons(δ2) with the nodes A and B, respectively.
The theory T is well-founded [54, p. 24] and it has a unique JTCS-complete extension
T hJTCS (W ∪ cons(δ2)), which is also JTCS-grounded, JTCS-preferred and JTCS-stable. It
is easy to check that the argumentation framework from Fig. 3 has a corresponding unique
complete, grounded, preferred and stable extension, namely, {B}.
Notice that the warrant underlying δ2 can also be questioned in a further course of rea-
soning. For example, one could find out that one of Harry’s parents was settled in Bermuda
at the time when he was born (T), which would prompt a new default reason via the rule
δ3 = t
′ : T :: (u′ · t ′) : ¬[u : (P → ¬[s : (B → S)])]
(u′ · t ′) : ¬[u : (P → ¬[s : (B → S)])] .
The consequent reads as “(u′ · t ′) is a defeasible reason denying that the reason u justifies
that if both Harry’s parents are aliens then it is not the case that s justifies that if Harry was
born in Bermuda, then Harry is a British subject”. Adding t ′ : T to W and δ3 to D would
thus reinstate the authority of the warrant used in δ1. Formally, this would mean that there
is an available default rule that gives you a reason denying that the warrant of δ2 is true.
Fig. 3 Abstract argumentation
framework based on T
S. Pandžić
The above presented account of default reasons suffices to represent reasoning from an
incomplete knowledge base, but it does not represent reasoning with information changes
that alter the premises from which an agent starts to reason. Still, the basic account can
already model non-monotonic behavior. One type of non-monotonicity is induced by the
definition of undercut as exemplified by the undercut of (s · r). We will refer to this way of
revising as “inferential” revision, because the argument (s ·r) : S is susceptible to attack and
potentially defeated due to the fallibility of inference δ1. This is characteristic for default
reasoning. For the argument (s · r) : S to be undermined, we consider a wider Toulminian
interpretation of the argument that includes the formula r : B as the data for the argument.
Since r : B is in the set W , the only possibility to attack r : B is to remove it from W
and to thereby undermine (s · r) : S. This kind of attack on arguments is studied under the
paradigm of plausible reasoning. In this paradigm, arguments are taken to be susceptible to
attack due to the uncertainty of their premises. The aim of the current work is to unify the
two paradigms in a single logical system.
3 Dynamic operations for default theories: Introducing undermining
attack
As mentioned in Section 1, undermining can be interpreted as an attack on the formu-
las that are considered to be facts, that is, factively justified formulas contained in a set
of premises W . In our view, undermining is essentially non-inferential because introducing
conflicting information that undermines facts cannot be done with the use of warrants.5 For
a default theory, these facts are represented by justification logic formulas from the set of
premises W and, in constructing a default argument, such formulas can be prerequisites of
default rules. A plausible interpretation of undermining defeaters would be that they propose
alternative states of facts which ground further reasoning steps. To be able to incorporate
factual changes, we need methods from belief revision. Our selection of the belief-revision
operations follows the way in which default theories are defined — since the set of premises
W is typically finite, it is natural to use operators for sets that do not require closure. There-
fore, our choice is to make use of base revision operators [39] instead of the AGM operators
[1].
To model changes to default theories, we will use the capacity of default logic to repre-
sent two levels of information certainty, roughly corresponding to the distinction between
skeptical and credulous reasoning (cf. [7]). The top-level of information certainty is repre-
sented by formulas that are included in all extensions. Typical examples of such formulas
are those contained in a set of premises W . The lower-level of information certainty is rep-
resented by formulas whose status is contingent on whether they become defeated by other
available information. Such formulas are typically consequents of default rules. Our goal
is to use the two levels and to define dynamic operators that can bring about the changes
that fix whether a formula is included in or excluded from all extensions, but also to define
non-prioritizing operations that leave the status of a formula undecided.
5The non-inferential view of information change is also relevant for human interaction. As Hlobil [40] argues,
we can believe by accepting testimonies, but we cannot make inferences by merely accepting testimony. Two
testimonies that contradict each other are to be, ceteris paribus, equally treated and the acceptance of new
information is not the same process as inferentially extending the existing (incomplete) information. We will
return to this issue in Section 5 where we present an “inferential” reading of undermining compatible with
the interpretation of undermining in, e.g. ASPIC+.
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To be able to model the dynamics at the two levels of information certainty, we extend the
above defined default theories with defaults without warrants, which correspond to Reiter’s
supernormal defaults, but (possibly) containing justification assertions:
δF =  :: F
F
.
Standard default rules with justification assertions encode inferential steps supported by
warrants. Rules such as δF above “are givens” [70, p. 227] and they do not rely on war-
rants as their reason-based assumptions, which is why we refer to them as “unwarranted”
defaults. In contrast to inferential steps, supernormal defaults will be used to represent
non-inferential, information-changing actions in which an agent accepts that a formula can
be included in (at least) one extension. We will extend sets of defaults with supernormal
defaults whenever we represent introducing uncertain information to a theory T or relegate
information from W to the status of uncertain information.
Why would we want to make changes only to the lower-level of information certainty or
alter a default theory at the level of some, instead of all extensions? Sometimes, an agent
has doubts with respect to whether it is safe to include some information or not and, analo-
gously, whether it is safe to remove some information or not. In the standard base revision
approach to modeling information change, incoming information is always prioritized over
existing information, which is ensured by the success postulate. Consider again Example 14
with the agent reasoning about Harry’s eligibility for British nationality. It is possible that,
according to the census record, Harry was born in Bermuda and, according to the military
record, he was born outside Bermuda. The fact that the agent first collected the census record
data and then collected the military record data cannot justify the prioritization of the newly
acquired information. If the agent does not know which information source is reliable, the
order of data input is irrelevant. In these cases, default logic can avoid the “naive” priority
ascription by the use of multiple extensions. The rest of this section gives a solution to the
problem of non-prioritized change of default theories, along with the more standard priori-
tized change. In a case of non-prioritized change, the corresponding dynamic operator uses
supernormal defaults with an aim to alter the lower-level of information certainty of a default
theory. On our interpretation of undermining attacks, whether undermining fully or par-
tially realizes its defeating potential depends on whether the new information is prioritized
or not.
3.1 Default theory expansion
We consider three kinds of change: expansion, contraction and revision. The first kind of
change corresponds to learning new information. For example, adding a formula F to a set
of premises W can be based on the information provided by some information channel. The
formal operation that naively adds new information without checking the joint consistency
of the resulting set of beliefs is called “expansion”:
Definition 15 (Expansion) For a default theory T = (W,D) and a formula F , T +F =
(W+F ,D) is the expansion of the default theory T , where W
+
F is the base expansion of the
set W such that W+F = W ∪ {F }.
If the added information results in an inconsistent set W+F , any definable JTCS extension
will be inconsistent. Notice that default theory expansion can already cause non-monotonic
behaviour on the level of default theory extensions. For example, if the added formula is
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a prerequisite for a default rule with an undercutter for some other default consequent, the
new information can result in removing elements from JTCS extensions of T .
An agent can approach accepting incoming information more cautiously. If the agent
accepts new information as a plausible premise, but hesitates to consider it a fact, the change
is made to the set of default rules:
Definition 16 (Conservative Expansion) For a default theory T = (W,D) and a formula
F , T ×F = (W,D∪{δF }) is the conservative expansion of the default theory T with F , where
δF = ::FF .
Notice that the operation × opens up a possibility that the formula F is included in all
extensions, but it can also be excluded from all extensions. For example, if ¬F is contained
in T hJTCS (W), then δF is not applicable. The introduced operators have the following
properties:
Proposition 17 For a default theory T = (W,D) possibly containing unwarranted default
rules and a JTCS formula F , it holds that
a) If F is not a contradiction, then F is contained in each JTCS extension of the theory
T +F .
b) If F is not a contradiction and if ¬F is not contained in any JTCS extension of T , then
F is contained in each JTCS extension of the theory T
×
F .
c) If W is not inconsistent and if ¬F is contained in T hJTCS (W), then F is not contained
in any JTCS extension of the theory T
×
F .
Proving Proposition 17 is straightforward.
3.2 Default theory contraction
How does an agent discard some information that is no longer considered to be reliable?
We will again differentiate between two strategies of discarding information or, more tech-
nically, of contracting default theories: one aims to remove information when an agent
is confident that the information is unreliable and another aims to relegate the status of
information reliability to a lower level. In our default theories, this will mean that the first
operation removes a formula from all extensions while the second operation leaves the pos-
sibility that extensions still contain the formula. One problem we face in removing a formula
from all theory extensions is that the base contraction of a set of premises W is necessary,
but not sufficient to secure that the formula will not be reintroduced by the application of a
default rule. To illustrate the need for such operation, consider that changes in information
may cause that a certain source of justification t is denied its reliability as a reason for some
formula F .
To deal with this problem, we propose to put restrictions on the application of default
rules. The aim of restrictions on application is to prevent an unwanted JTCS formula to
become a part of any default theory extension. For a JTCS formula R, a default rule
δ = F ::G
G
is restrictedly-applicable to a JTCS-closed set of formulas Γ according to the
restriction R (or R-applicable for short) iff:
• F ∈ Γ and
• ¬G /∈ RΓ ,
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where RΓ = T hJTCS (Γ ∪ {R}). The role of the restriction R is to prevent the formula ¬R
to extend the JTCS theory Γ by blocking the applicability of each default whose consequent
formula would introduce ¬R to the extended theory, if the consequent is added to Γ .
Using the restricted variant of default applicability, we will define restricted variants of
default theories and their processes. A corresponding operational semantics, in which we
restrict the application of defaults by a JTCS formula R, can then be defined for those sets
of premises W that do not entail ¬R.
Definition 18 (Application-Restricted Default Theory) For a JTCS formula R, an
application-restricted default theory [R]T is defined as a pair (W,D), where the set W is a
finite set of JTCS formulas such that ¬R /∈ T hJTCS (W) and D is a countable set of default
rules.
Application-restricted default theories differ from default theories defined in Section 2.2
only in the view of restrictions that might eliminate some possible ways to build default
processes that would otherwise be possible without restrictions. To define processes for an
application-restricted theory [R]T , recall that the In-set from Definition 7 is a closed set
of JTCS formulas that represents current evidence base. The In-set is now relativized to R
in application-restricted default theories: RIn(Π) = T hJTCS (In(Π) ∪ {R}). Processes of an
application restricted theory are built taking into account the restricted notion of applicabil-
ity, i.e., we require each default of a sequence to be R-applicable (and not only applicable)
to Π [k]. The definition of closed processes is adapted for a theory [R]T as follows: an
application-restricted process Π is said to be closed iff every δ ∈ D that is R-applicable to
In(Π) is already in Π .
Notice that the definitions of warrant, undercut, acceptability, as well as potential, JTCS-
admissible, JTCS-preferred, JTCS-stable, JTCS-complete and JTCS-grounded extensions
from Section 2.2 all depend on the definitions of In-sets and default processes. Therefore,
the definitions of these concepts have equivalent formulations for application-restricted
default theory pairs (W,D). In fact, application-restricted default theories are a generaliza-
tion of default theories from Definition 4. Each default theory T = (W,D) can be defined
as an application-restricted default theory []T = (W,D), where the restriction formula is
a tautology. For the theory []T , the sets In(Π) and In(Π) coincide.
For any application-restricted default theory, the expansion operation ([F ]T )+G and the
conservative expansion operation ([F ]T )×G are both defined analogously to the correspond-
ing default theory operations. Notice the following exception: expanding an application
restricted theory [F ]T with the formula ¬F , that is, ([F ]T )+¬F . According to Definition 18,
an application-restricted theory can only be defined for a set of premises W that does not
entail the negation of a restriction formula, so the theory ([F ]T )+¬F is not defined. In general,
the following holds in such cases of expansion:
• For an application-restricted theory [F ]T and a JTCS formula F , if ¬F ∈ T hJTCS (W ∪
{G}), then the expansion of an application-constrained theory [F ]T with a formula G is
defined as the the default theory T +G .
Therefore, the expansion of [F ]T with ¬F is the default theory T +¬F , which possibly con-
tains unwarranted rules. After expanding [F ]T with ¬F , W+¬F contains the formula ¬F ,
which means that the resulting theory cannot be application-restricted by the formula F .
We can now define a contraction operation that aims at removing a formula at the level
of a whole default theory. The operation corresponds to the action of removing information
when an agent is confident that the information is not reliable. To achieve this in a default
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theory, a formula has to be removed from the set of premises by a base contraction and its
reintroduction should be prevented. In the definition of contraction, remainder sets will be
used: for any set of JTCS formulas Γ and a formula F , the remainder set Γ ⊥F is defined
as the set of maximal subsets of Γ that do not entail F .
Definition 19 (Contraction) For a default theory T = (W,D) and a formula F , the
application-restricted theory [¬F ]T −F = (W−F ,D ∪ D−!F ) is the contraction of the default
theory T by F , where





2. D−!F = {δG | G ∈ W \ (
⋂
(W⊥F) ∪ {F })}.
Notice that an application-restricted default theory [¬F ]T −F is definable for any theory T
since, due to condition 1, the formula F cannot be an element of the set T hJTCS (W−F ).
The combination of the restriction ¬F and the set of default rules D−!F provides a bal-
anced solution for avoiding extremely cautious and extremely incautious behavior. Since
the set of formulas W⊥F usually contains many elements, theory contraction operations
need to include a procedure of selecting the formulas that can be kept after contracting by
F , excluding F itself. It is difficult to define such procedures in a principled and intuitively
plausible way. In default theory contraction, we do not need to force selection by a function.
Instead, the choice of formulas selected upon contraction depends on the type of extension
that is being computed. For example, a JTCS-preferred extension corresponds to the idea
of maxichoice contraction, while JTCS-grounded extension corresponds to the idea of full
meet contraction [39, pp. 12-13].
Using again the two-leveled perspective on changing default theories, we can define a
more conservative way of giving up a belief. In conservative contraction, agents are reluctant
to entirely give up on some information, but the information is no longer considered to be a
fact. To relegate the status of a formula in such a way within a default theory, the formula
is removed from the set of premises W and then reintroduced through application of a
supernormal default rule.
Definition 20 (Conservative Contraction) For a default theory T = (W,D) and a formula
F , T ÷F = (W−F , D∪D!F ) is the conservative contraction of the default theory T by F , where





2. D!F = {δG | G ∈ W \ ⋂(W⊥F)}.
By analogy with T ÷F , we define the conservative contraction [¬F ]T
÷
F that realizes the
same set of JTCS extensions as the theory [¬F ]T −F .
Conservative contraction is an open-ended operation in the sense that it does not pre-
clude the possibility of reintroducing a formula F in an extension through a default rule
application. Furthermore, it leaves open the possibility that F occurs in all extensions of
the resulting default theory. Recall that, analogous to conservative contraction, conserva-
tive expansion might not guarantee that there will be any extension containing a formula
F , after a default theory has been conservatively expanded with F . Antoniou [7, p. 1149]
takes a different approach in defining a more conservative contraction operation for Reiter’s
default theories. His idea is to secure that there is at least one extension added that does
not contain the formula removed from the set of premises. In our view, it is unnecessary to
have such an operation. If some formula is not regarded to be a fact, but it is still plausi-
ble that the formula is true, accepting it as the only available information might be the only
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reasonable action. Instead of “forcing” an extension without the formula, conservative con-
traction enables the possibility of an extension without the formula. If there is no support for
the contrary statement whatsoever, an agent might still need to hold on to the only available
information. The following statement follows from Definition 19:
Proposition 21 For a default theory T = (W,D) possibly containing unwarranted default
rules and a non-tautological JTCS formula F , it holds that F is not contained in any JTCS
extension of the theory [¬F ]T −F .
Proof From the condition 1 of the definition, we know that the full meet contraction of W
removes the formula F from the set of premises of [¬F ]T −F . Moreover, from condition 2 and
the fact that the application of each default rule from D−!F in [¬F ]T
−
F is restricted by ¬F ,
we know that F cannot be reintroduced into an evidence base In(Π) by applying defaults
from a process Π for any process Π of [¬F ]T −F . Therefore, F cannot be contained in any
JTCS extension of [¬F ]T −F .
3.3 Default theory revision
The task of adding new information to the set of premises by the expansion operation (Defi-
nition 15) can lead to an inconsistent set of premises. A more realistic dynamic operator for
adding information needs to specify a process by which an agent adds information incon-
sistent with W without being committed to an inconsistent set of premises. One possible
way is to only add information via the conservative expansion operation (Definition 16), but
this comes with an obvious flaw: an agent is not able to confidently replace an old, unreli-
able piece of information with a new, reliable one. This is one of the motivations to define a
default theory revision operator that not only adds a formula, but also removes inconsistent
formulas at one of the two levels of the default theory.
A revision operation can be defined from a combination of the expansion and contraction
operations.6 In our approach, we will follow the traditional arrangement of the operations
as proposed by Hansson [39, p. 203], namely, removing formulas will precede adding
a formula. Those revision operations in which contraction is followed by expansion are
called “internal revision” operators. The choice of a revision operation used for a particu-
lar revision example depends on both whether old information is to be removed confidently
or conservatively and whether new information is to be added confidently or conserva-
tively. We define the following four internal revision operators for each combination of the
operations.
Definition 22 (Revision Operators) For a default theory T = (W,D) and a formula F ,
(internal) revision operators for T are defined as follows:
1. T ∓F = ([F ]T −¬F )+F
2. T F = ([F ]T −¬F )×F
3. T F = (T ÷¬F )+F
4. T F = (T ÷¬F )×F
6If we were to exhaust all possible combinations, eight revision operators could be defined. Note that the
revision operation symbols used here reflect the composition of the introduced revision operations that are
defined in terms of contraction and expansion variants. The symbols are not intended to be in continuity with
the standard usage of revision operation symbols.
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The variety of possible revision operators raises the question about what kinds of revision
strategies they represent.
We can show that the four operations amount to two strategies. Again, as in the cases of
expansion and contraction, one strategy is meant to revise confidently and the other strategy
to revise more conservatively. The key to show this is to prove that the operations ∓,  and
 give equivalent extensions in revising a default theory with some formula F . This is the
result that we will prove shortly, based on the a) clause of Proposition 23:
Proposition 23 For a default theory T = (W,D) possibly containing unwarranted default
rules and a JTCS formula F , it holds that







F , it holds that F ∈ Γ .
b) If F is not a contradiction, then there is a JTCS extension Γ of the theory T

F such
that F ∈ Γ .
c) If F is not a contradiction, then there is a JTCS extension Γ of the theory T

F such
that ¬F /∈ Γ .
Proof To prove that a) holds, consider the three revision operators ∓,  and  and the




F . For the case of the default theory T
∓
F , it follows from
Proposition 21 that ¬F is not contained in any JTCS extension of [F ]T −¬F . By Proposition 17
a), F is contained in each JTCS extension of ([F ]T −¬F )
+
F .
For the case of the default theory T F , it follows from Proposition 21 that ¬F is not
contained in any JTCS extension of [F ]T −¬F . Moreover, the set F In(Π) contains the formula
F and it is not JTCS-inconsistent, which means that the default rule ::FF is restrictedly-
applicable to any JTCS extension of the conservative expansion ([F ]T −¬F )
×
F of the theory





For the case of the default theory T F , consider that the base contraction of W ensures
that ¬F cannot be contained in the set of premises W−¬F of the default theory T ÷¬F , but¬F can still be reintroduced by applying the defaults from D!¬F . However, after expanding
the theory T ÷¬F by F , the inclusion of the formula ¬F into any JTCS extension of the
theory T F is blocked and, by Proposition 17 a), F is contained in each JTCS extension
of T F .
To prove that b) holds, consider that the base contraction of W ensures that ¬F can-
not be contained in the set of premises W−¬F for the conservative contraction T
÷
¬F . This
means that, for the conservative expansion (T ÷¬F )
×
F , it holds that the default rule
::F
F
is applicable to T hJTCS (W) and, therefore, contained in at least one JTCS extension
of T F .
To prove c), consider that after the base contraction of W by ¬F , JTCS extensions of





b) holds, then c) holds.
To show the equivalence of the operators ∓,  and , we first say that for any
σ -extension, where
σ ∈ {JTCS-admissible, JTCS-complete, JTCS-grounded, JTCS-preferred, JTCS-stable},
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σ(T ) is the set of all σ -extensions for a theory T . Then we prove that for any default theory




F realize the same set of extensions under any JTCS
extension-based semantics for default theories. The following result is obtainable from
Proposition 23 a), together with the fact that none of the three operators ∓,  and  change
the status of formulas that do not take part in F -implying sets:
Theorem 24 For any default theory T = (W,D), a JTCS formula F and the (internal)
revision operators ∓,  and , it holds that σ(T ∓F ) = σ(T F ) = σ(T F ).
Intuitively, the three operations represent a type of revision in which an agent confidently
includes new and possibly inconsistent information into all JTCS extensions. Another option
specified by the operator  is to accept the new information in some extensions while
maintaining the old information in other extensions. The revision operators comply to the
two-leveled view of default semantics: the first three revision operators of Definition 22 fix
the status of a revision at the level of a default theory as a whole, while the last revision
operator targets at modifying only some extensions. Any of the three operations T ∓F , T

F
and T F will be referred to as the Revision of T with F and the operation T

F will be referred
to as the Conservative Revision of T with F .
3.4 The notion of undermining
Finally, we are now able to say in what way the dynamic operations connect to the notion
of undermining defeat. It was mentioned in the Introduction that by undermining we under-
stand the attack whereby argument premises are being questioned. This intuition can now
be cashed out by using those dynamic operators for default theories that involve contracting
a default theory.
Definition 25 (Undermining) For a default theory T = (W,D) and a JTCS formula F such
that F ∈ W and F = pre(δ) for some δ ∈ D, F is undermined iff W is contracted by F by
applying any of the following operations to T :
1. [¬F ]T −F (Contraction)
2. T ÷F (Conservative Contraction)




G for JTCS-inconsistent formulas F and G (Revision)
4. T G for JTCS-inconsistent formulas F and G (Conservative Revision).
Notice that there is no requirement on the structure of F . However, each meaningful
undermining targets justification assertions because W cannot be successfully contracted
by a tautology and justification assertions are the only other type of formula occurring as a
default prerequisite. Not every attack on the premises results in confidently revising the set
W . It is possible that undermining leaves an agent undecided as to whether newly acquired
information or older information should be prioritized.
Starting from the theory T defined in Example 14, we can give a formalized undermining
example to show the difference between inferential and non-inferential ways of information
acquisition. Recall that the agent started to reason from the information that Harry was born
in Bermuda. This piece of information is represented in the set of premises W with the
formula r : B, where r can now be taken to reflect the source of information as, e.g., data
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from census records.7 However, if the information based on military records says that Harry
was born outside Bermuda, and having no means to resolve this conflict of information, the
theory T needs to be conservatively revised. The theory T v:¬B is the revision of T with the
formula v : ¬B, where v reflects the new source of information for the claim that Harry
was not born in Bermuda. To see this revision in more detail, we extend Example 14.
Example 26 (Continuation of Example 14) We start from the theory T = (W,D) that
consists of the set of premises W = {r : B, t : P } and the set of defaults D = {δ1, δ2} with
δ1 = r : B :: (s · r) : S
(s · r) : S and δ2 =
t : P :: (u · t) : ¬[s : (B → S)]
(u · t) : ¬[s : (B → S)] .
The first dynamic operation in revising with v : ¬B is contracting the theory by ¬v : ¬B.
The resulting theory T ÷¬v:¬B = (W−¬v:¬B,D ∪ D!¬v:¬B) consists of the set of premises
W−¬v:¬B = {t : P } and the set of defaults D extended with the default
δr:B =  :: r : B
r : B .
Finally, the agent conservatively expands the theory T ÷¬v:¬B with the information that Harry
was not born in Bermuda. The new default theory is defined as T v:¬B = (T ÷¬v:¬B)×v:¬B . The
change of the theory after conservative expansion with v : ¬B amounts to adding the new
default rule
δv:¬B =  :: v : ¬B
v : ¬B ,
which means that the new set of defaults is D∪D!¬v:¬B ∪{δv:¬B}. The revised theory T v:¬B
changes the default processes in which the agent reasons about Harry’s nationality, as Fig. 4
illustrates. In total, the theory T v:¬B has five closed processes.
The number of closed processes also indicates that the attack relation is now more com-
plex, compared to the attack relation based on the starting theory T . As a result, we obtain
the structure of attacks in Fig. 5. In Fig. 5, arguments (s · r) : S and (u · t) : ¬[s : (B → S)]
are represented with the nodes A and B. After the conservative revision of T with v : ¬B,
the space of arguments is enlarged. The new arguments r : B and v : ¬B are represented
with the nodes C and D. The nodes C and D attack each other because r : B and v : ¬B
are mutually JTCS-inconsistent arguments that cannot co-occur as a part of the same In-set
for T v:¬B .
Notice that the symmetric attack between A and D results from the fact that (s · r) : S
and v : ¬B cannot together extend an evidence base In(Π) for any process Π of T v:¬B ,
even though these two arguments are not JTCS-inconsistent. Nonetheless, it holds that an
evidence base that contains (s · r) : S is JTCS-inconsistent with an evidence base that
contains v : ¬B. This exemplifies the importance of tracking JTCS-inconsistent evidence
bases in mapping a default theory to a corresponding abstract argumentation output.
Finally, we look into the changes in the structure of computable JTCS extensions, com-
pared to Example 14 before undermining took place. Unlike T , the theory T v:¬B is not
7Technically, r and other justifications that we call “sources” are some specific justifications produced with-
out “default application” inference steps. Each information source might be interpreted as a concatenation of
more basic pieces of evidence by applying the sum operation. For example, r might be thought of as a con-
catenation of all the instances of entries from the census records (r1 +r2 + . . .+rn), where r1, r2, . . . , and rn
are formally justification constants. This interpretation could be fully formalized in JTCS by allowing for
constants that justify not only basic logic axioms, but also contingent propositions, as done in [13].
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Fig. 4 The process tree shows all the processes of T v:¬B as the branches of the tree. Each node of the tree is
labeled with an In-set after a default rule (edges) has been applied, but in such a way that we display only the
formulas that are added to In-sets as a result of applying the available defaults
well-founded. This is expected, as the added unresolved symmetric attacks generate mul-
tiple complete extensions. Table 1 displays all the possible JTCS extensions. It can be
checked that they correspond to the extensions obtainable from the abstract argumentation
framework in Fig. 5.
To illustrate how conservative revision differs form revision, consider an alternative sce-
nario in which the agent prioritizes the new information based on military records and the
Fig. 5 Abstract argumentation
framework corresponding to the
default theory T v:¬B
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Table 1 All the JTCS extensions of T

v:¬B
JTCS-admissible Γ1 Γ2 Γ3 Γ4
JTCS-complete T hJTCS (Γ2) T hJTCS (Γ3) T hJTCS (Γ4)
JTCS-grounded T hJTCS (Γ2)
JTCS-preferred T hJTCS (Γ3) T hJTCS (Γ4)
JTCS-stable T hJTCS (Γ3) T hJTCS (Γ4)
Γ1 = W , Γ2 = W ∪ {cons(δ2)}, Γ3 = Γ2 ∪ {cons(δr:B)}, Γ4 = Γ2 ∪ {cons(δv:¬B)}
agent is confident that the census records data should be given up. In this case, the theory
T has to be revised with the formula v : ¬B saying that Harry was born outside Bermuda.




v:¬B . That is, T is first con-
fidently contracted by ¬v : ¬B. The obtained application-restricted theory [v:¬B]T −¬v:¬B
is then expanded with v : ¬B. In T ∓v:¬B , the set of premises (W−¬v:¬B)+v:¬B now con-
tains the formula v : ¬B with δ2 as the only rule that is applicable. The set of defaults
D−!¬v:¬B also contains the rules δ1 and δr:B that cannot be applied to any process of T
∓
v:¬B .





We are then left with a simple way to determine the extensions: T ∓v:¬B is well founded
and T hJTCS ((W−¬v:¬B)
+
v:¬B ∪ {cons(δ2)}) is its unique JTCS-complete, JTCS-grounded,
JTCS-preferred and JTCS-stable extension.
4 Trivialization in structured argumentation and argumentative
paradoxes in justification logic
The logic studied in this paper distinguishes between strict rules (rules without exceptions)
of inference and defeasible rules (rules that may have exceptions) of inference. Strict rules
are determined by the JTCS axioms and rules. Defeasible inference rules are determined by
default rules. It is common in formal argumentation frameworks with rule-based languages
to distinguish between strict rules and defeasible rules as, for example, in ASPIC+ [48]. In
such frameworks, arguments are built according to the available strict and defeasible rules.
Recently, a number of authors have pointed out that using any “explosive” logic as the basis
of strict rules may lead to undesired problems of trivialization of argumentation frameworks
due to the principle Ex falso sequitur quodlibet.
In this section, we discuss why using our operational semantics to model rebutting and
undermining attacks avoids the problem of trivialization. We first introduce Caminada’s
examples [19] that motivate the trivialization problem. Then we provide an alternative for-
malization of these examples in default justification logic. Finally, we prove that default jus-
tification logic satisfies the postulate of non-interference (and, therefore, crash resistance)
that specify conditions under which argumentation frameworks avoid trivialization.
4.1 Trivializing argumentation systems
To illustrate how the Ex falso principle trivializes argumentation frameworks, we first define
the concept of a defeasible theory based on propositional logic, an instance of explosive
logics.
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Definition 27 (Defeasible theory) For the propositional logic language L, a defeasible the-
ory DT is a triple (P,RD, n), where P is a (finite and consistent) set of propositional
formulas and RD is a countable set of defeasible rules of the following form
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn =⇒ ψ,
where ϕ1, . . . , ϕn and ψ are meta-variables ranging over wff-s in L, and n is a “rule-
naming” function such that:
n : RD → L.
The following informal reading of the rule above is given by Caminada [19] and Wu and
Podlaszewski [72]: “If ϕ1, . . . , ϕn hold, then probably ψ holds”.
Based on a defeasible theory DT = (P,RD, n), we define an argumentation system
AS as a triple (RS,RD, n), where RS = {−→ ϕ | ϕ ∈ P } ∪ {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn −→ ψ |
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn L ψ}. Intuitively, RS is the set of rules without exceptions based on classical
reasoning, while RD is the set of rules with exceptions. The fuction n makes it possible that
defeasible rules refer to one another, which is essential to the way in which undercutters are
modeled.8
We can now illustrate the problem of trivialization by the following example from [19,
pp. 2724-2725].
Example 27 ([19]) Consider the defeasible theory DT1 = (P1, RD1, n1), where P1 =
{wf r, js,mns} and RD1 = {wf r =⇒ r, js =⇒ s,mns =⇒ ¬s}. The following interpre-
tation is given for propositional formulas: let wf r be the proposition “the weather forecaster
predicts rain tomorrow”, let js be the proposition “John says that the cup of coffee con-
tains sugar”, let mns be the proposition “Mary says that the cup of coffee does not contain
sugar”, let r be the proposition “It will rain tomorrow” and let s be the proposition “The cup
of coffee contains sugar”. Throughout the current example, we assume an empty naming
function, that is, n1 = ∅.
Based on the defeasible theory DT1, we define the argumentation system AS1 =
(RS1, RD1, n1) with RS1 = {−→ wf r,−→ js,−→ mns}. The argumentation system
AS1 gives the following arguments:
A1 : −→ wf r A4 : A1 =⇒ r
A2 : −→ js A5 : A2 =⇒ s
A3 : −→ mns A6 : A3 =⇒ ¬s
Additionally, propositional logic gives the strict rule s,¬s −→ ¬r , because it holds that
s,¬s L ¬r . This allows us to construct the following argument:
A7 : A5, A6 −→ ¬r .
Notice that the arguments A5 and A6 rebut each other, because their conclusions are
inconsistent. It is also the case that argument A5 rebuts argument A7, because the conclusion
s of A5 is inconsistent with the conclusion ¬s of A6, which is a sub-argument of A7. Anal-
ogously, argument A6 rebuts argument A7, because the conclusion ¬s of A6 is inconsistent
8For more technical details on how to construct arguments from strict and defeasible rules in an argumen-
tation system and how arguments attack one another, we refer to [19, pp. 2710-2711]. Caminada [19] also
specifies a partial preordering on RD, both for DT and AS. The current presentation allows us to discuss the
problem of trivialization, without going into more technical details and without specifying ordering among
defeasible rules.
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with the conclusion s of A5, which is a sub-argument of A7. Finally, classical logic allows
us to build the argument A7 whose conclusion ¬r rebuts the conclusion of the argument
A4. The other way around, namely, that A4 rebuts A7, does not hold. The conclusion of the
argument A7 is based on a strict rule and, therefore, A7 is not defeasible on its “top rule”
whereby we conclude that ¬r holds (see [19, p. 2711] for technical details of the definition
of rebuttal). The entire structure of attacks can be represented by the abstract argumentation
framework from Fig. 6. It can be noticed from the figure that applying grounded semantics
to the framework from Fig. 6 gives the grounded extension {A1, A2, A3}, which does not
include the argument A4.
The problem of trivialization is exemplified by the rebuttal of A4 with the argument A7.
Informally, the problem with the argument A7 is that the question of whether to accept
that “the cup of coffee contains sugar” or not should not decide on the acceptability of an
unrelated conclusion, such as the conclusion “it will rain tomorrow” of the argument A4.
By the end of this section, we argue that our operational semantics is fully immune to the
problem of trivialization. Before showing that, we first discuss some important differences
between structured argumentation frameworks, such as the above discussed argumentation
systems that define defeasible and strict rules over a propositional knowledge base, and
default justification logic. Default justification logic models arguments as object-level for-
mulas of the JTCS language. This brings multiple advantages. One of them is the ability to
“hard-code” all the reasoning steps that were taken in building arguments, as well as attacks
among arguments, in the structure of reason terms. In this paper, we focus on interpreting
reason terms as sources of information that could be questioned by other sources. Notice
that in Example 28, the argumentation system AS1 does not yield any opposition between
the arguments A2 and A3, as can be seen in the corresponding Fig. 6. However, if John says
that the cup of coffee contains sugar and Mary says that the cup of coffee does not con-
tain sugar, there is, intuitively, an immediate opposition between the two testimonies. This
opposition is more straightforward than the type of opposition between, for example, two
conclusions of default inferences.
Recall from Section 3 that two testimonies that contradict each other are to be, ceteris
paribus, equally treated. We argue there that the acceptance of new information based on a
source of information is not the same process as inferentially extending incomplete informa-
tion. While the latter process belongs to the default reasoning paradigm, the former process
belongs to the plausible reasoning paradigm. In plausible reasoning, we focus on uncertain
premises, rather than on uncertain inferences. In Example 28, A2 represents the argument
with the conclusion that “John says that the cup of coffee contains sugar”. This argument is
a sub-argument of another argument, namely A5, with the conclusion that “the cup of coffee
Fig. 6 Abstract argumentation framework corresponding to the argumentation system AS1
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contains sugar”. But the conclusion of A5 is not inferentially extending incomplete infor-
mation, as default rules do, but rather restating what is already entailed by John’s testimony.
The conflict between John’s and Mary’s testimonies is in all the relevant aspects analogous
to the conflict between the census record data and the military record data on whether Harry
was born in Bermuda or not. Following that example, we will give a justification logic
formalization of Example 28.
Example 29 Suppose that we start to reason from the information that the weather forecaster
says that it is expected to rain tomorrow and that John says that the cup of coffee contains
sugar. Let E be the proposition “it is expected to rain tomorrow”, let R be the proposition
“it will rain tomorrow” and let S be the proposition “the cup of coffee contains sugar”.
Moreover, let w represent the weather forecaster’s report as a source of information and
let j represent John’s testimony as a source of information. We define the default theory
T2 = (W2,D2) such that W2 = {w : E, j : S} and D2 = {δ3}, where9
δ3 = w : E :: (v · w) : R
(v · w) : R .
Additionally, we learn that Mary says that the cup of coffee does not contain sugar. We take
the reason term m to represent Mary’s testimony as a source of information. The opposition
between Mary’s and John’s testimonies is modeled as an undermining attack, without using
rebutting attacks, as done in [72] and [19]. In the situation where we do not prioritize John’s
testimonies over Mary’s testimonies or vice versa, we need to conservatively contract the
theory T2 with the formula m : ¬S. The first step is contracting the theory by ¬m : ¬S.
This gives us the theory T2
÷
¬m:¬S = (W2−¬m:¬S,D2 ∪ D!¬m:¬S) with the set of premises
W2
−
¬m:¬S = {w : E} and the set of defaults D2 extended with the default
δj :S =  :: j : S
j : S .
Removing j : S from the set of premises is followed by a conservative expansion of the
theory T2
÷
¬m:¬S with the information that Mary says that the cup of coffee does not contain
sugar. The new default theory is defined as T2

m:¬S = (T2÷¬m:¬S)×m:¬S . According to the
conservative expansion with m : ¬S, we add the default rule
δm:¬S =  :: m : ¬S
m : ¬S .
Finally, the resulting set of defaults is D2 ∪ D!¬m:¬S ∪ {δm:¬S}.
It can be checked that the rule δ3 is applicable to all processes, regardless of the conflict
between the reasons j and m that is produced by applying the rules δj :S and δm:¬S . The
latter two rules will never be applicable to a same default process. This prevents the possi-
bility of producing a default justification logic analogue to the spurious argument A7 from
Example 28. A similar characterization holds for rebutting attacks. Rebutting reasons are
always contained in separate default processes and, therefore, they cannot be combined to
9Notice that we keep the inference from the datum that “it is expected to rain tomorrow” to the conclusion
that “it will rain tomorrow”. Unlike testimonies about the cup of coffee, this inference is a proper default
extension beyond the initial information, because predictions and expectations are not themselves factual
claims.
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produce arguments based on the Ex falso sequitur quodlibet principle. The problem of trivi-
alization caused by the Ex falso principle from Example 28 affects structured argumentation
frameworks with strict and defeasible rules, but it does not affect default justification logic.
In the case of Example 29, the structure of attacks that can be obtained from the justifi-
cation logic default theory T2

m:¬S is simpler than the structure represented by Fig. 6. This
structure is illustrated by the abstract argumentation framework in Fig. 7.
In default justification logic two testimonies introduced by δj :S and δm:¬S attack each
other. This is captured by the symmetric attack between the arguments A2 and A3 that
correspond to j : S and m : ¬S, respectively. Notice that the “weather forecast” arguments
A1 and A4, that is, w : E and (v · w) : R, remain unquestioned by the conflict between
John’s and Mary’s testimonies. Such an outcome matches our common intuitions behind
the example. Accordingly, we can check that the argument (v · w) : R is not compromised
and that it is contained in each JTCS variant of the complete, preferred, grounded and stable
extensions defined for the argumentation framework in Fig. 7.
4.2 Argumentative paradoxes
Trivialization is recognized as a problem for structured argumentation frameworks such as
ASPIC+. In response to the problem, Prakken [56, p. 111] suggested that preferred and
stable semantics could avoid the problem. For example, it can be easily checked that the
argument A4 is contained in each preferred extension of the framework displayed in Fig. 6,
but not in its grounded extension. Wu and Podlaszewski [72] and Caminada [19] extend
Example 28 in such a way that it creates problems for all the standard semantics. We will
now present this extension and discuss some further important points at which our log-
ical approach diverges from structured argument frameworks in representing arguments.
Fig. 7 Abstract argumentation





Interestingly, the extended version of Example 28 leads us to an argumentative intensional
paradox in justification logic similar to the intensional version of the “Liar paradox” [59].
Example 30 (Continuation of Example 28) Let the defeasible theory DT 2 = (P2, RD2, n2)
be defined as follows: P2 = P1 ∪ {junrel,munrel} and RD2 = RD1 ∪ {junrel =⇒
¬jrel, munrel =⇒ ¬mrel}, n2(js =⇒ s) = n2(junrel =⇒ ¬jrel) = jrel and
n2(mns =⇒ ¬s) = n2(munrel =⇒ ¬mrel) = mrel. In the extended defeasible theory
DT2, we include the information that “John says that John is unreliable” and that “Mary
says that Mary is unreliable”, where the first piece of information is formally captured
with the propositional formula junrel and the second one with the propositional formula
munrel. The extended set of defeasible rules RD2 contains the rules junrel =⇒ ¬jrel
and munrel =⇒ ¬mrel that read as “If John says that John is unreliable, then probably
John is not reliable” and “If Mary says that Mary is unreliable, then probably Mary is not
reliable” respectively. But if John is not reliable, then the fact that John says something is
not a reason to believe what he is saying. This means, according to [72] and [19], that both
the rule js =⇒ s and the rule junrel =⇒ ¬jrel are undercut. To capture this formally,
the conclusion ¬jrel (or “John is not reliable”) of the rule junrel =⇒ ¬jrel is also the
negation of the name of both the defeasible rule js =⇒ s and junrel =⇒ ¬jrel accord-
ing to the rule-naming function n2. Analogously, mns =⇒ ¬s and munrel =⇒ ¬mrel are
both undercut as a result of concluding that ¬mrel or that “Mary is not reliable”, which is
also the negation of the name of the two defeasible rules according to n2.
Based on the defeasible theory DT 2, we define the argumentation system AS2 =
(RS2, RD2, n2) with RS2 = RS1 ∪ {−→ junrel, −→ munrel}. The argumentation sys-
tem AS2 allows us to construct all the arguments A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6 and A7, as well
as the following arguments:
A8 : −→ junrel A10 : A8 =⇒ ¬jrel
A9 : −→ munrel A11 : A9 =⇒ ¬mrel
With the added undercutting attacks, AS2 yields the abstract argumentation framework in
Fig. 8. There is a unique complete extension, namely {A1, A2, A3, A8, A9}, which is also
preferred and grounded, for the abstract argumentation framework in Fig. 8 and for the
underlying argumentation system AS2.
In addition to overlooking the immediate conflict between A2 and A3, the extended
example treats the arguments A8 and A9 as unproblematic. They only result in self-defeating
arguments after we build the arguments A10 with A8 as its sub-argument and A11 with A9
as its sub-argument. However, there is a more fundamental problem with the propositions
Fig. 8 Abstract argumentation framework corresponding to the argumentation system AS2
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“John says that John is unreliable” and “Mary says that Mary is unreliable”, that is, there is
already a problem with the arguments A8 and A9. Justification logic reveals that these two
arguments belong to the class of “intensional paradoxes” [58].
Intensional paradoxes are paradoxes of self-reference that “involve intensional notions
such as knowing that, saying that, etc.” [58, p. 193]. A classic example is given by Prior
[59, p. 17] in an intensional version of the Liar paradox:“It is said by a Cretan that whatever
is said by a Cretan is not the case”. To formalize this paradox, Prior uses propositional
quantification [68, § 3.5]. Looking at our example sentences, we can notice one prominent
divergence from the intensional Liar paradox, namely that John claims that John is not
reliable, rather than that whatever is said by John is not the case.10 Thus, it is not the case
that John necessarily denies what John is saying, but he is rather denying that what he is
saying could be a reason to accept what he is saying. Given our interpretation of reason
terms as sources of information, justification logic is able to translate this type of self-
referentiality of sources induced by John’s and Mary’s statements. However, neither is the
JTCS language nor any other standard justification logic language expressive enough to
translate those statements into justification logic intensional paradoxes. What is missing is
the mentioned mechanism of propositional quantification. In an extended language with the
possibility to quantify over propositions, we could formalize A8 and A9 as follows:
j : ∀p(¬j : p) and m : ∀q(¬m : q),
where p and q are propositional variables. This formalization confronts us with the question
of whether there is any proposition that the reason j (or the reason m) justify or not. One
possible way to address the problem of intensional paradoxes is to allow true contradictions
in some contexts, e.g., allowing that the intensional variant of the Liar paradox is both true
and false [58, p. 198].
Whatever the solution is to the presented problem, A8 and A9 are not ordinary argu-
ments. The argument “John says that John is unreliable” opens up an interesting topic of
argumentative paradoxes that has not been explored up to now. Such arguments are rightly
deemed paradoxical arguments due to the self-referential character of the reason terms j
and m that are meant to justify that they cannot justify a proposition. With the help of jus-
tification logic, we can conclude that there are problems for the grounded extension of the
argumentation system AS2 beyond the omission of the attack between the arguments A2 and
A3. The grounded extension of AS2 also concedes two paradoxical arguments, namely A8
and A9. According to our analysis, it is already at the level of A8 and A9 that each of these
arguments defeats itself. What accounts for this difference is that, in AS2, self-defeat occurs
as a result of the undercut formalized with the arguments A10 and A11. However, justifica-
tion logic shows that the self-defeat here is not targeting default inferences, but rather the
sources j and m and their reliability. This means that the extension presented in Example 30
should be understood as self-undermining, rather than self-undercutting.11
10Of course, “John” individuates a single entity, whereas “(a) Cretan” individuates a class of entities.
11Again, as in the case of the arguments A5 and A6 and their sub-arguments A2 and A3, [72] and [19]
formalize A10 as an argument based on A8 and A11 as an argument based on A9. But the conclusions of the
arguments A10 and A11 do not go beyond what is specified in the testimonies formalized with A8 and A9. The
arguments A10 and A11 are thus superfluous, according to our non-inferential interpretation of information
acquisition. Notice that, even if there were genuine examples of self-undercutting attacks that would defeat
two arguments in rebuttal, as depicted in Fig. 8, the problem of trivialization could not be caused by the Ex
falso principle in default justification logic for the same reasons given above.
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If we would follow the proposed extension of the basic justification logic language
with propositional quantifiers, there is an interesting connection with the cycles of attacks
in Dung’s abstract argumentation frameworks. According to our discussion above, the
acceptability status of the following self-defeating argument cannot be easily resolved:
j : ∀p(¬j : p).
If we consider a cycle of of two sources denying each other’s reliability, e.g.,
j : ∀p(¬k : p) and k : ∀q(¬j : q),
there seems to be a possible resolution. Namely, if j : ∀p(¬k : p) is added to an evidence
base In(Π ′) and k : ∀q(¬j : q) to In(Π ′′) such that In(Π ′) and In(Π ′′) are inconsistent,
the arguments might still be accepted in, e.g., different preferred extensions. However, a
three-member cycle of attacks, such as
j : ∀p(¬k : p), k : ∀q(¬l : q) and l : ∀r(¬j : r),
is again difficult to resolve and it is difficult to interpret the value of statements justified
by the reason terms j , k and l. Following the same principle of adding a new member, a
cycle of four reason terms denying one another’s reliability is resolvable in terms of deter-
mining the acceptability status of reasons. This pattern is familiar from the the study of the
semantic properties of odd- and even-length cycles, especially in the context of determin-
ing preferred extensions [14]. Bench-Capon [15] argues that semantic differences in odd-
and even-length cycles are justified because odd-length cycles can be seen as represent-
ing paradoxes and even-length cycles can be seen as representing dilemmas. Our default
justification logic reconstruction of undermining cycles corroborates the intuition behind
Bench-Capon’s analysis.
Is it a downside of our logic based on the JTCS language that we are not able to represent
the arguments A8 and A9? There are reasons not to see this as a downside. The precision of
the JTCS language and its ability to represent arguments as the object-level formulas gives
a detailed insight into the nature of attacks between arguments and logical properties of
defeasible reasons, but it also shows that there might be some limitations to the logical rep-
resentation of defeasible arguments. These limitations have not been noticed in the context
of structured argumentation frameworks, because such frameworks do not specify a single
logical system and they do not represent reasons as formal objects.
4.3 The JTCS non-interference postulate
In the last part of this section, we focus on showing that our logic satisfies the so-called
“non-interference” postulate, first proposed in [20] as a criteria for avoiding the trivialization
problem. The idea behind the postulate is that those defeasible theories that allow us to
construct arguments for any conclusion from contradictory premises would influence “the
entailment of a completely unrelated (syntactically disjoint) defeasible theory when being
merged to it” [19, p. 2728].
Before stating the postulate for defeasible theories, we give some preliminary defini-
tions based on [19]. We say that the theories DT1 and DT2 are syntactically disjoint iff
Atoms(DT1) ∩ Atoms(DT2) = ∅, where Atoms(DT ) is the set of all atomic proposi-
tional formulas occurring in DT . The union of defeasible theories DT 1 = (P1, RD1, n1)
and DT 2 = (P2, RD2, n2) is defined as the defeasible theory DT 1∪2 = (P1 ∪
P2, R1 ∪ R2, n1 ∪ n2). For an argumentation semantics σ , let Cnσ (DT ) be the set of conse-
quences defined as {Concs(E1), . . . , Concs(En)}, where E1, . . . , En are the σ extensions
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of the argumentation system AS based on DT and Concs(Ei) is the set of conclu-
sions of all the arguments contained in Ei . Moreover, for a set of propositions S and
the set of atomic propositional formulas A, we take S|A to be defined as {ϕ ∈ S |
each atomic propositional formula in ϕis in A}. Finally, for a set S defined as a set of sets
of propositions {S1, . . . , Sn}, take S|A to be defined as {S1|A, . . . , Sn|A}.
Non-interference For syntactically disjoint defeasible theories DT 1 = (P1, RD1, n1)
and DT 2 = (P2, RD2, n2) such that P1 and P2 are consistent and an argumentation
semantics σ , it holds that
Cnσ (DT 1)|Atoms(DT 1) = Cnσ (DT 1∪2)|Atoms(DT 1).
Thus, the conclusions that are acceptable under some argumentation semantics for the defea-
sible theory DT1 should remain acceptable under the same argumentation semantics after
merging DT1 with any other syntactically disjoint defeasible theory.
To define the JTCS variant of the postulate, we will use the application-restricted gener-
alization of default theories from Definition 18. Recall that each default theory T = (W,D)
can be defined as an application-restricted default theory []T = (W,D) with a tau-
tological restriction. We first take Atoms([F ]T ) to be the set of all atomic propositional
formulas occurring in an application-restricted default theory [F ]T = (W,D) and we take
Subterms([F ]T ) to be the set of all subterms occurring in [F ]T . We say that the default the-
ories [F ]T1 and [G]T2 are syntactically disjoint iff Atoms([F ]T1) ∩ Atoms([G]T2) = ∅ and
Subterms([F ]T1) ∩ Subterms([G]T2) = ∅. The union of application-restricted default theo-
ries [F ]T1 = (W1,D1) and [G]T2 = (W2,D2) is defined as the application-restricted default
theory [F∧G]T1∪2 = (W1 ∪ W2,D1 ∪ D2). For a JTCS semantics σ , let Cnσ ([F ]T ) be the
set of consequences defined as {Γ1, . . . , Γn}, where Γ1, . . . , Γn are the JTCS-σ extensions
of [F ]T . For a set of JTCS formulas Γ and the set of atomic propositional formulas A,
we take Γ|A to be defined as {F ∈ Γ | each atomic propositional formula in F is in A}.
Finally, for a set of sets of JTCS formulas S = {Γ1, . . . , Γn}, take S|A to be defined as
{Γ1|A, . . . , Γn|A}. The following is the JTCS variant of the non-interference postulate:
JTCS non-interference For syntactically disjoint application-restricted default theories
[F ]T1 = (W1, D1) and [G]T2 = (W2,D2) such that W1 and W2 are JTCS-consistent and
a JTCS-σ semantics, it holds that
Cnσ ([F ]T1)|Atoms([F ]T1) = Cnσ ([F∧G]T1∪2)|Atoms([F ]T1).
Default justification logic with rebutting, undercutting and undermining attacks can
be shown to satisfy the JTCS non-interference postulate for all JTCS complete-based
semantics. For JTCS-stable semantics, non-interference cannot be guaranteed for joined
(applicability-constrained) default theories. The reason is that the presence of self-
undercutting arguments in some default theory may eliminate the definability of the
JTCS-stable extensions, after the two theories have been merged. The following proposition
states the result:
Proposition 31 For any two syntactically disjoint application-restricted default theories
[F ]T1 = (W1,D1) and [G]T2 = (W2, D2) such that W1 and W2 are JTCS-consistent and
any JTCS semantics σ , where
σ ∈ {JTCS-complete, JTCS-grounded, JTCS-preferred},
it holds that
Cnσ ([F ]T1)|Atoms([F ]T1) = Cnσ ([F∧G]T1∪2)|Atoms([F ]T1).
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Proof In this proof, we use the notion of syntactically disjoint JTCS formulas. We say that
F1 and F2 are syntactically disjoint iff Atoms(F1) ∩ Atoms(F2) = ∅. We first show that
adding the premises, default rules and the restriction of [G]T2 = (W2,D2) cannot change
the applicability status of default rules from [F ]T1 = (W1,D1). For some process Π of
[F∧G]T1∪2 containing δ∗ ∈ D2, consider a segment Π [k−1] of Π to which δ∗ is applicable.
Consider also some default δ′ ∈ D1. If δ′ is applicable to Π [k − 1], assume that applying
δ∗ blocks the application of δ′ to Π [k]. According to the restricted applicability of defaults,
this means that the formula ¬req(δ′) is in F∧GIn(Π [k]), but not in F∧GIn(Π [k − 1]). Since
F∧GIn(Π [k−1]) is JTCS-consistent, either cons(δ∗) is not syntactically disjoint with req(δ′)
or there is some JTCS formula in F∧GIn(Π [k − 1]) that syntactically connects the atoms of
cons(δ∗) and req(δ′), which is not an instance of JTCS axioms. Contradiction.
If δ′ is not applicable to Π [k − 1], assume that applying δ∗ activates the application of
δ′ to Π [k]. According to the restricted applicability of defaults, this means that the formula
pre(δ′) is not in F∧GIn(Π [k]), but it is in F∧GIn(Π [k − 1]). Again, since F∧GIn(Π [k − 1])
is JTCS-consistent, either cons(δ∗) is not syntactically disjoint with pre(δ′) or there is some
JTCS formula in F∧GIn(Π [k − 1]) that syntactically connects the atoms of cons(δ∗) and
pre(δ′), which is not an instance of JTCS axioms. Contradiction. Since we also know that
the formulas from the JTCS-consistent sets W1 and W2 are syntactically disjoint and that
the formulas F and G are syntactically disjoint, the applicability status of default rules
from [F ]T1 = (W1,D1) cannot be changed by premises, default rules and the restriction of
[G]T2 = (W2,D2). Thus the set of potential extensions of [F ]T1 = (W1, D1) is identical to
the set of potential extensions of [F∧G]T1∪2, modulo formulas from W2 and cons(D2).
If this holds then, in the union [F∧G]T1∪2, there are no formulas from cons(D2) that
are JTCS-inconsistent with any of the formulas from W1 or cons(D1). Moreover, if [F ]T1
and [G]T2 are syntactically disjoint, then WS [F ]T1 ∩ WS [G]T2 = ∅. This implies that
there are no new attacks on the formulas from cons(D1) and that exactly all the JTCS-
admissible extensions of [F ]T1 are preserved in [F∧G]T1∪2. This means that the formulas
contained in JTCS-complete, JTCS-grounded and JTCS-preferred extensions of [F ]T1 (or
Cnσ ([F ]T1)|Atoms([F ]T1)) are identical to the formulas contained in JTCS-complete, JTCS-
grounded and JTCS-preferred extensions of the union [F∧G]T1∪2, relative to the atoms of
[F ]T1 (or Cnσ ([F∧G]T1∪2)|Atoms([F ]T1)).
To conclude this section, we also note that the JTCS variants of indirect (and thus
direct) consistency are guaranteed if JTCS consistency of the set of premises W is
assumed (consistency of premises is also assumed when proving the postulate in, e.g.,
ASPIC+ [19, p. 2717]). The proof is straightforward, given the definitions of (restricted)
applicability, JTCS-extensions and the assumption of consistent premises.
5 Related and future work
5.1 Related work
The study of basic default justification logic began with [50]. The logic is further developed
and described in [53] and [54]. This paper extends [52] presented at the 11th International
Symposium on Foundations of Information and Knowledge Systems (FoIKS2020). The new
formal result reported here is the satisfaction of the non-interference postulate. In addition
to non-interference, the paper proposes default justification logic as a toolkit to study a
relatively unexplored domain of paradoxes in formal argumentation.
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This paper contributes to the study of non-prioritized belief revision operations, that is,
such operations for which the new information has no special priority due to its novelty
[37, 38]. The way in which our operators are defined meaningfully combines resources
from both belief revision and default logic. The relation between belief revision and non-
monotonic reasoning has long been a matter of discussion [36, 43] among AI researchers.
Gärdenfors [36] sees them as the two sides of the same coin. His views are based on the
possibilities to translate belief revision postulates into different non-monotonic inference
variants. Makinson [43] also follows the direction of translating between belief-revision
postulates and conditions on non-monotonic inference conditions. Although it was not our
primary aim to discuss the relation between modeling reasoning with incomplete informa-
tion in default theories and modeling reasoning with changing information in belief revision,
we showed that our justification logic creates a useful junction for the two approaches and
provides a fresh outlook on their relation.
As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, our approach to structured argumenta-
tion dynamics builds on a similar strategy as Antoniou’s [7] approach to the dynamics of
standard default theories. Antoniou’s approach significantly differs from ours in the way he
treats those changes that add or remove a formula at the level of some, but not necessarily
all extensions. He first defines [7, pp. 1146-1147] an operation that secures the existence
of at least one extension that contains a formula and then [7, p. 1149] another operation
that removes a formula from at least one extensions of a Reiter’s default theory. Unlike our
conservative contraction operation, none of Antoniou’s contraction operations leaves the
inclusion status of a formula undecided. In fact, to secure that a formula is not contained in
at least one extension, Antoniou adds an extension where introducing the formula in ques-
tion is blocked. Similarly, he does not consider an expansion operator that does not ensure in
advance that a formula is contained in an extension, as done in our conservative expansion.
We will consider two problems with the operations from [7] that fix the status of a for-
mula by either adding a formula in at least one extension by revision or removing a formula
from at least one extensions by contraction. Both of them are technical in nature and they
raise issues about the economy of introducing such operations. Firstly, the operations are
based on adding a new atom to the language so as to prevent applying defaults with that
atom as one of their “justifications” (our consistency requirement formulas) to a process
together with those rules that have the negation of that atom as one of their justifications.
This ensures manipulating the content of extensions, but it is rather involved and the new
atom is introduced as an ad hoc solution to keep the formulas from unwanted interaction.
The second problem is also related to the method of adding new extensions for which a
formula needs to be included in (or excluded from). As we mentioned, [7] relies on introduc-
ing a new atom and its denial to induce inconsistency. This ensures that there are extensions
that do (by revision) or do not contain (by contraction) the target formula. As a side effect,
the definitions of those operations make it impossible that any old default rule of the revised
or contracted theory becomes applicable together with the rule which is added for the revis-
ing or contracting purposes. A downside of such operations is that they eliminate meaningful
interaction between such defaults.
Some approaches to default reasoning such as [42] and [45] represent the idea of defaults
in dynamic epistemic logic. The main focus of van Linder, van der Hoek and Meyer [42]
is to embed supernormal defaults in a multi-agent modal logic with knowledge, belief and
update modalities. The authors show that Reiter’s extensions can be represented as a result
of consecutive jump actions to default conclusions, but they do not focus on how such
extensions are revised due to information changes. Meyer and van der Hoek [45] intro-
duce a preference modality to distinguish between known and (provisionally) preferred
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information. A non-monotonic belief revision component consists in changing preferences
as a result of obtaining knowledge.
Baltag, Renne and Smets [12, 13] and Renne [61] define extensions of justification logic
in which agents may acquire new information that defeats the reasons they accepted. The
logics combine belief revision and dynamic epistemic logic techniques to model a kind
of defeat that seems to correspond to undermining. However, each of the logics assumes
prioritizing new information and none of these logics is able to model undercut and rebuttal.
Even so, approaches based on dynamic epistemic logic are attractive because they open up
a possibility of developing a multi-agent justification logic with defeaters.
We indicated in Section 1 to this paper that the work in the area of the dyna-
mics of argumentation frameworks without argument structures is already well-developed.
Among the approaches, it is worth mentioning those that follow the belief revision meth-
ods applied to Dung’s argumentation frameworks, such as that of [17] and [24]. Booth et al.
[17] start from a labelling approach to Dung’s argumentation frameworks and constraints
on a framework’s output. Their focus is on finding the best way to recover a rational output
given a framework and a constraint on its output. For this, they use ordering of conflict-
free labellings in a way that the most rational conflict-free labelling is chosen when none
of complete labellings respects the constraint. In the work by Diller et al. [24], we find two
kinds of revision operators. One of them revises an abstract argumentation framework by
taking a propositional formula as a means to represent the new information, while the other
operation revises an input framework by information in the form of another framework.
Both operations give a single output framework respecting a particular type of rankings on
extensions.
Although Section 4 establishes that our logic behaves rationally with respect to the non-
interference postulate, there is still a need for a thorough investigation of how our logic
relates to other rationality postulates that are discussed by, e.g., Caminada [19]. This is
especially interesting now that our logic models all the three standard types of argumen-
tative attacks. Up to now, this has been possible only by using argumentation frameworks
such as ASPIC+. In Section 4, we indicated that satisfying consistency postulate has a
straightforward proof. In [54, § 5], other desirable properties of extensions (such as, e.g.,
closure, free-precedence etc.) are discussed in the context of default justification logic with-
out undermining. The addition of undermining can be assumed not to affect the satisfaction
of those properties.
It is still an open question how structured argumentation frameworks in general exactly
relate to default justification logic. Similarities between the two consist in the examples that
these two types of systems aim to express and in concepts that the two systems share. How-
ever, major differences in methodology and logical vocabularies prevent us from making
bold claims about the connections between structured argumentation frameworks (includ-
ing, but not limited to, ABA [66], ASPIC+ [48], DefLog [69], DeLP [35] and deductive
argumentation [16]) and default justification logic. One point on which we diverge from
all argumentation frameworks is that we represent arguments as object-level formulas of
the JTCS language. Thus, when we define “argument acceptance” and JTCS extensions,
we are in fact bringing about different ways to define a logical consequence relation. This
means that our system can justly be considered as a logic of arguments, rather than a frame-
work for arguments. From the technical perspective, what underlies the possibility to model
arguments as object-level formulas is that justification terms label propositional formulas.
This, in turn, enables the rendering of exclusionary reasons by means of undercut from
Definition 10.
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It is known that ASPIC+ [56] also explicitly models undercutting, rebutting and under-
mining defeat. We will illustrate how the above discussed difference between framework
and logic reflects in the way in which ASPIC+ models undercutters. In ASPIC+, undercut-
ting attack is understood as an attack on a defeasible inference step of an argument. But to
express this relation in the system, we need a function for “lifting” names of defeasible rules
as corresponding formulas of the base language. On our approach, warrants have the role
of default rules in the system. But recall that, on our formalization of warrants, they already
are justification logic formulas that underlie default rules. The relation between ASPIC+
and default justification logic could be appropriately described as a relation between a
meta-theory of argumentation and a specific theory of argumentation.
One conceptual difference between ASPIC+ and our logic concerns the ways in which
the two systems model undermining attacks. That is, ASPIC+ seems to adopt the idea of
what we called “inferential” undermining attacks in the sense that an argument can be
attacked on its defeasible premise if there is some argument whose conclusion is, for exam-
ple, the denial of a defeasible premise of the first argument. At first glance, this notion
of undermining is eliminated by our definition that specifies formulas from W as target
formulas for undermining. However, the idea of inferential undermining attacks is compat-
ible with the way we represent argument premises and our definition could in principle be
adapted to include this undermining attack variation. For example, consider some justifica-
tion assertion t : F introduced as a consequent of a supernormal default. Such formula can
plausibly be regarded as a defeasible (or ordinary) premise within a default theory, under
the interpretation that the lower level of information certainty indicates the level of reliabil-
ity for t . Now consider that there is some warranted default introducing (u · v) : ¬F as its
consequent. By relaxing Definition 25, such cases would account for the inferential reading
of undermining.
An interesting way to connect our logic to structured argumentation frameworks is to
study how it relates to Defeasible Logic Programming [34, 35] (or DeLP, for short). The
logic presented here is based on the ideas from default logic and the relationship between
logic programming and default logic was already discovered in [44] through the stable
model semantics. In DeLP, we find a different interpretation of Toulmin’s warrants. DeLP
warrants are used to determine a “status of a claim” by resorting to a “set of dialectical
trees that was generated to decide the warrant status of the arguments related to the claim”
[35, p. 64]. In the context of the current work, it is interesting that DeLP has defeasible rules
with an empty body that are interpreted as presumptions. Such rules seem to formally cor-
respond to supernormal defaults used in this paper. Connections between DeLP and default
justification logic are especially worth exploring given the new developments of Extended
Defeasible Logic Programming [22] with the added notions of backing and undercutting.
5.2 Some limitations and future work
In this paper, we define local change operations that do not, in general, give a recipe on how
to further change their output default theories. But to represent actual dynamic contexts of
argumentation, we need to make our operators global, rather than local, and enable iterated
revision. Note that, for example, the second output theory ([F ]T −¬F )
×
F of Definition 22 is an
application-restricted default theory. If we want to allow for iterated contraction and gener-
alize the contraction operation to application-restricted theories such as ([F ]T −¬F )
×
F , we need
to deal with multiple restrictions to the output theory, and possibly mutually inconsistent
restrictions. This could be done if we allow that an application-restricted theory [F ]T can be
further restricted by a formula G in such a way that, for any default δ, we need to check if
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req(δ) is consistent with both F In(Π) and GIn(Π), thus defining the application-restricted
default theory [G,F ]T .
An important issue that we do not address here is that of computational costs related
to the operational semantics with argumentation formulas, and in particular related to the
problem of determining whether an argument is contained in an extension. Even restricted
versions of propositional default logic do not fare well in terms of tractability [65] compared
to classical propositional logic. Despite the fact that all our default theories are normal, the
problem of, e.g., determining the existence of extensions is aggravated by the added gram-
mar of reason terms. Consider that, in contrast to propositional default logic, we need to look
at all the closed default processes to establish that, for example, a JTCS-stable extension
is defined for some default theory. Moreover, asking whether a formula belongs to a JTCS
extension turns into a problem for which we also need to keep track of all the branches of a
process tree, which resembles the problems of determining skeptical or credulous entailment
for a formula in propositional default logic.
It can also be noticed that our defaults are not given as default schemes, as it is the case
with standard default logics. The fact that the only type of rules are exclusively specific
defaults may be seen as a limitation. To see why, consider that we sometimes want to talk
about reasons for why warrants hold as being of a general type, based, for example, on some
observed regularity. This is one step that is missing for a full formalization of Toulmin’s
argumentative schema [54, p. 16]. Recent developments of the first-order variant of the logic
of proofs [33] might bring us closer to this goal. By using first-order logic of proofs, we
will enable a formalization of generalized reasons for Toulmin’s warrants in the following
format of default rule schemes:
t{x} : F :: (u · t){x} : G
(u · t){x} : G ,
where x in t{x} : F is a free variable throughout the derivation t .
There are other paths for future research connected to quantification. As discussed in
Section 4, semantic modeling of paradoxes in argumentation would require a system with
quantification over propositional variables. In such a system, we would be able to precisely
describe the relation between resolving the paradoxes in formal argumentation and resolving
odd- and even-length cycles of attacks in Dung’s abstract argumentation frameworks (see
Section 4). Note also that the idea of quantifying over justification terms has already been
explored by the justification logic community [10, § 8].
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we took a step beyond the default reasoning paradigm and we investigated an
extension of default justification logic with plausible reasoning patterns. In plausible rea-
soning, an agent needs to deal with uncertainty of premises and inconsistent premises. In
contrast, the basic default justification logic assumed certainty of premises and uncertainty
of inferences. The purpose of considering plausible reasoning was to provide a unified
logical system for all three standard types of argumentative attack, namely undercutting,
rebutting and undermining. Justification assertions turned out to be an appropriate logical
format for representing undermining attacks. In the plausible-reasoning extension of our
logic, an assertion t : F from a set of premises W is interpreted in such a way that t repre-
sents a source that supports the formula F . On our account, undermining is then interpreted
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as a removal of the unreliable source of information t . What we needed is to define opera-
tions that are able to alter even the set of premises W . To this end, we used techniques from
belief revision to model information dynamics of justification logic default theories.
The assumption behind this paper is that default reasoning deals with inconsistencies that
arise from extending the starting premises, while belief revision deals with inconsistencies
that result from receiving information incompatible with the starting premises. When this
assumption is applied to justification assertions, it becomes clear that belief revision has
more to do with the plausible reasoning paradigm than with default reasoning paradigm.
Once again, justification logic acted as an intermediary system, this time by throwing light
on the relation between default and plausible reasoning that was translated into relations
between default logic and belief-revision techniques. With their fine-grained representation
of reasons, justification assertions gave us a better perspective on the ways in which incom-
ing information causes different types of non-monotonic behavior in belief revision and
default logic. To the best of our knowledge, the system presented here is the first logic to
combine plausible and default reasoning to capture all the standard notions of defeat in AI.
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como, G.D., Catalá, A., Dilkina, B., Milano, M., Barro, S., Bugarı́n, A., Lang, J. (eds.) ECAI 2020 - 24th
European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications,
vol. 325, pp. 841–848. IOS Press (2020). https://doi.org/10.3233/FAIA200174
50. Pandžić, S.: A logic of default justifications. In: FermÉ, E., Villata, S. (eds.) Nonmonotonic Reasoning,
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53. Pandžić, S.: Reasoning with Defeasible Reasons. Ph.D. thesis, University of Groningen (2020)
54. Pandžić, S.: A logic of defeasible argumentation: Constructing arguments in justification logic. Argu.
Comput. Pre-press 1–45. https://doi.org/10.3233/AAC-200536 (2021)
55. Pollock, J.L.: Defeasible reasoning. Cognit. Sci. 11(4), 481–518 (1987)
56. Prakken, H.: An abstract framework for argumentation with structured arguments. Argument Comput.
1(2), 93–124 (2010)
57. Prakken, H.: Historical overview of formal argumentation. IfCoLog J. Logics Appl. 4(8), 2183–2262
(2017)
58. Priest, G.: Intensional paradoxes. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 32(2), 193–211 (1991)
59. Prior, A.N.: On a family of paradoxes. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 2(1), 16–32 (1961)
60. Reiter, R.: A logic for default reasoning. Artif. Intell. 13(1-2), 81–132 (1980)
61. Renne, B.: Multi-agent justification logic: Communication and evidence elimination. Synthese 185(1),
43–82 (2012)
62. Rescher, N.: Plausible Reasoning: an Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Plausibilistic Inference.
Assen, Van Gorcum (1976)
Structured argumentation dynamics
63. Rescher, N.: Dialectics: A Controversy-Oriented approach to the theory of knowledge. SUNY Press,
Albany (1977)
64. de Saint-Cyr, F.D., Bisquert, P., Cayrol, C., Lagasquie-Schiex, M.C.: Argumentation update in YALLA
(yet another logic language for argumentation). Int. J. Approx. Reason. 75, 57–92 (2016)
65. Stillman, J.: The complexity of propositional default logics. In: AAAI-92: Proceedings of the Tenth
National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pp. 794–799 (1992)
66. Toni, F.: A tutorial on assumption-based argumentation. Argument Computat. 5(1), 89–117 (2014)
67. Toulmin, S.E.: The Uses of Argument. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1958/2003)
68. Uzquiano, G.: Quantifiers and Quantification. In: Zalta, E.N. (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, Summer 2020 Edn. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University (2020)
69. Verheij, B.: DefLog: On the logical interpretation of prima facie justified assumptions. J. Log. Comput.
13(3), 319–346 (2003)
70. Verheij, B.: The Toulmin argument model in artificial intelligence. In: Rahwan, I., Simari, G.R. (eds.)
Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence, pp. 219–238. Springer (2009)
71. Vreeswijk, G.A.W.: Studies in defeasible argumentation. Ph.D. thesis Free University of Amsterdam
(1993)
72. Wu, Y., Podlaszewski, M.: Implementing crash-resistance and non-interference in logic-based argumen-
tation. J. Log. Comput. 25(2), 303–333 (2015)
Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
